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It is a good thing for the operator to post an update as it helps eliminate the speculation. It also indicates a level of professionalism on their part. Lat year a cylinder explosion killed an 18 year old in a local dive centre and this was totally hidden from the public.
It seems clear that the upfront intention was to penetrate the wreck.
Does anyone know what equipment they had, whether they ran lines and what the "missing diver protocol" was? Training levels would also be interesting.
Respect to the others involved, it really sounds like they did everything possible.
The way the statement was worded, it sounded to me like the 'missing diver protocol' was simply to head for the surface. I'm guessing, though, that doesn't make sense in the context of wreck penetrations? I also couldn't really tell from the statement if their plan was to enter the engine room. I could interpret the statement two ways: that all three entered the engine room, the deceased became separated and then silted the engine room up; or that the deceased became separated, entered the engine room and then silted it up. There's no mention of guidelines which, to me, is a strong hint that they had none, but it's definitely not conclusive.
I agree with tonylindeque, though: releasing a statement is a sign of professionalism. We seldom see anything of the sort, often not even an official acknowledgement that an incident occurred, from dive ops (the world over).
Great from the dive operator to make a statement ! At least now we have a much more accurate indication of how this tragedy unfolded. I don't think I have ever seen comments from diver ops so soon after an event like this.
Well done to the NSRI & Police divers that did an excellent job of recovering the body under very trying circumstances!
The other two divers who surfaced when their leader went missing is the best thing to do. The sooner the better ..to get additional help in to try and either save or then at least recover the missing diver. No use for them to follow into a silted environment and then to also get lost or entangled in a confined space.
The report states that a) he silted up the engine room and b) penetrated deeper in an attempt to exit. From this, I gather that he consciously and willingly entered the engine room (as it's impossible to do so by accident), and the fact that his attempt to exit in fact led him deeper into the wreck suggests that he did not make use of a reel/guideline which is, as mentioned earlier in this thread, rule number one for entering just about ANYTHING under water from which the surface is not directly accessible, along with dependable and redundant light sources. I believe that the lack of a guideline can be listed as one of the major reasons that led to the initial problem and eventually his demise.
This is obviously not in any way a pointing of fingers or playing the "blame game" so to speak, but it is in cases such as these that we as divers should strive to determine the possible causes as accurately as possible for the sake of all those on this forum, so that a lesson can be learned and hopefully, even if just for a single diver, save someone's life in similar circumstances in the future.
PS: I absolutely love wreck diving, and recently dived the SAS Pietermaritzburg of which I shot the whole dive in HD which is available here. The video was shot with a GoPro Hero 3 Black using my own rig with 2x high power LED video lights, yet you will notice how that light just disappears into the darkness in some of the voids in that wreck... I'll upload similar videos as I shoot them which will be available here.
The report states that a) he silted up the engine room and b) penetrated deeper in an attempt to exit. From this, I gather that he consciously and willingly entered the engine room (as it's impossible to do so by accident), and the fact that his attempt to exit in fact led him deeper into the wreck suggests that he did not make use of a reel/guideline which is, as mentioned earlier in this thread, rule number one for entering just about ANYTHING under water from which the surface is not directly accessible, along with dependable and redundant light sources. I believe that the lack of a guideline can be listed as one of the major reasons that led to the initial problem and eventually his demise.
This is obviously not in any way a pointing of fingers or playing the "blame game" so to speak, but it is in cases such as these that we as divers should strive to determine the possible causes as accurately as possible for the sake of all those on this forum, so that a lesson can be learned and hopefully, even if just for a single diver, save someone's life in similar circumstances in the future.
PS: I absolutely love wreck diving, and recently dived the SAS Pietermaritzburg of which I shot the whole dive in HD which is available here. The video was shot with a GoPro Hero 3 Black using my own rig with 2x high power LED video lights, yet you will notice how that light just disappears into the darkness in some of the voids in that wreck... I'll upload similar videos as I shoot them which will be available here.
Thanks for your insight. To put my post into context: I know nothing about wreck diving, I've never penetrated a wreck and don't ever plan to do so. I was hoping that someone with more knowledge about wreck diving in general and that wreck in particular could perhaps clarify the dive op's statement (since their additional knowledge gives contextual info I don't have). It seems to me now, based on all the comments, that it's almost certain that there was no guideline.
The report states that a) he silted up the engine room and b) penetrated deeper in an attempt to exit. From this, I gather that he consciously and willingly entered the engine room (as it's impossible to do so by accident), and the fact that his attempt to exit in fact led him deeper into the wreck suggests that he did not make use of a reel/guideline...
...it is in cases such as these that we as divers should strive to determine the possible causes as accurately as possible for the sake of all those on this forum, so that a lesson can be learned and hopefully, even if just for a single diver, save someone's life in similar circumstances in the future.
Analysis for overhead environment fatalities goes well if Shek's factors are used, as they are the primary factors in most, if not all (non-medical) overhead environment scuba fatalities:
Failure to use a continuous guideline. Tick. This seems likely given the nature of the incident.
Failure to use 'Rule of Thirds. Unknown gas plan. Unknown gas state at time of penetration.
Failure to limit dive to 'operational limits' of air (40msw). Unknown back-gas / END selection
Failure to be trained or exceeding the level of training. Tick. No evidence of appropriate training utilized in this dive.
Failure to carry minimum 3 lights. Unknown. Lights of limited impact in a confined environment silt-out scenario.
Solo Overhead Diving. Tick. No timely search and rescue was conducted by supporting divers.
On 4 January 2014 a fellow diver, James Magee, passed away while diving the 70s artificial reef created by the scuttling of the MV Rockeater in Smitswinkel Bay, just south of Simonstown. This event has further brought into stark focus the risks inherent in wreck diving. The depth that the incident occurred at was between 30 33 meters and James was diving on a 32% Nitrox mix.
This is at the borderline of narcosis management, but no strong argument would exist for a lower END than 30m. Nitrox 32% would be the optimal gas choice. There is, however, no mention of the volume of gas supply and redundancy carried (doubles...)
James was leading the way for two other open circuit divers when he became separated from his dive group.
This concerns me significantly. It should be quite hard to get separated in the confines of a wreck. Effective light communications protocols tend to ensure constant awareness. A deployed guideline also keeps the team together. Both issues would need to fail for a separation to occur - constituting two major human errors on behalf of the team.
He subsequently silted up the engine room and in what seems to have been an effort to exit the silted engine room, he penetrated deeper into the wreck via a tunnel / walkway into the prop shaft area.
Sometimes silt-out is unavoidable inside a wreck, but only if specific passages are planned - and consequently, it is prepared for. In all other respects, the risk of silt-out can be significantly mitigated through proper training and avoided altogether through prudent, risk-averse, route selection.
Silt-out may, or may not, be determined as a human error.
The parameters of the silt-out may definitely be a human error, when combined with considerations of other negligent errors by the diver (i.e. going into a silt-prone area with no guideline) signifying that is was not anticipated, avoided or contingencies planned.
Proper guideline deployment would have allowed a timely and assured exit, even in the instance where visibility was totally lost. This remains the sole purpose of guideline deployment. It is also why a lack of guideline deployment features in a vast majority of wreck fatalities.
A secondary resolution would have been for the disorientated (silted-out) diver to conduct an exit search with reel/safety spool. This is taught on technical wreck courses - the level of training pertaining to penetration dives beyond the light zone (as this dive was). The purpose of the lost line/lost exit drill is prevent the victim progressing further into the wreck - as this is foreseen as a common occurrence in lost-visibility situations and, again, is a factor that features in a majority of wreck fatalities. This drill/protocol features on all advanced/technical wreck and cave courses.
James finally succumbed to an inescapable entanglement in the stern inspection hold where he drowned.
I am unsure what constitutes an "inescapable entanglement". I suspect this was an exaggeration - and what was meant was "an entanglement that the victim, lacking team assistance, was unprepared or incapable of extracting themselves from".
Advanced/Technical wreck and Cave training both teach comprehensive entanglement drills. Effective team protocols also mitigate against risk of entanglement.
This, of course, assumes that the diver was properly equipped with, at least, two appropriate cutting devices in accessible locations. It should be noticed that, again, the effective deployment of guideline would have mitigated against this risk. Advanced/technical wreck divers, as per cave divers, are taught to deploy guidelines in awareness of entanglement/entrapment hazards. The route of the guideline should be placed effectively to keep divers away from such risks.
The other members of the dive group followed missing diver protocol and surfaced.
This statement is unclear.
Did the divers follow a missing diver protocol...which was unsuccessful...and then surface?
Or was the missing diver protocol to surface? (as per an open water 'lost buddy' protocol; i.e. search for one minute and ascent to re-group at the surface).
I will note that the later option is entirely inappropriate to a lost diver inside a wreck. Again (sorry for being repetitive), technical/advanced wreck training (just like cave training) teaches a formal missing diver protocol - this includes coordinated, intelligent, searches using safety spools off the guideline. It is practicable even in zero visibility.
Again, (more repetition, sorry) the existence of a deployed guideline provides a critical factor in the potential success or failure of a missing diver search. Properly trained wreck divers would rarely venture far from the guideline, which significantly limits the parameters of a search. The lost diver would conduct their own search for the guideline via a safety spool. The team would search for the diver, via safety spool, off the guideline. There is a high expectation of success.
Did the search team leave search lines in position when they abandoned the search?
Were search lines used at all?
Why/when was the decision to surface made?
The issue of the nature of this 'missing diver protocol' is a key factor determining whether this victim could, indeed, have been saved from death.
Once they had surfaced they notified the skipper who raised the alarm. A group of rebreather divers subsequently surfaced and the decision was made for 3 of these divers to descend back to the wreck and an extended search of the wreck commenced. The three divers returned to the surface over an hour later after unsuccessfully recovering James.
If a guideline had been deployed (and left in position), then the search parameters would have been significantly reduced. An 'extended' search would have been unnecessary. The search would have started in the vicinity of the guideline and extended in directions/areas where evidence existed of diver passage (silt-disturbance, air trails on ceilings etc).
James epitomised the spirit of the recreational diver. His enthusiasm, constant smile and commitment to the sport will be greatly missed. Please join us in remembering a great proponent of our beloved sport
I'm going to be harsh - but this is the Accidents and Incidents forum...and is supposed to have educational value. I will preserve sentimentality for the 'Condolences' page. If you are easily offended by honest observation, please skip the following paragraph:
James was not committed to the sport. Commitment would have entailed undertaking proper training and having the self-discipline to refrain from diving beyond the limits of training and experience, or diving without utilizing the necessary equipment and protocols. Neither did he epitomize the spirit of the recreational diver, at least not in any responsible, risk-averse and safety-orientated manner. He was not a great proponent of the sport- his tragic, but ultimately quite easily avoidable death is a testament to that reality. Great divers provide role-models, not harsh, fatal, lessons.
I might have stopped the analysis before the condolences, but I suppose however harsh, it's not incorrect. Then again I did not know the diver personally and as such I might be more inclined to accept the reality than those who knew him. For the sake of the lesson to be learnt, it's important to remain objective. That video is a clear indication of what a silt up looks like on a good day. Now imagine that in Cape Town visibility at low-light 30m.
Devon diver , your video and other discussion points make it a lot more clear for plebs like me to realise how quickly things can go wrong when penetrating a wreck. Especially at depth/dark and if it is a large wreck like in this case. Your points show step by step how many mistakes have probably been made. All of these divers could have died.
So either I'm psychic, or this scenario occurs sufficiently frequently it's predictable.
Analysis for overhead environment fatalities goes well if Shek's factors are used, as they are the primary factors in most, if not all (non-medical) overhead environment scuba fatalities:
Failure to use a continuous guideline. Tick. This seems likely given the nature of the incident.
Failure to use 'Rule of Thirds. Unknown gas plan. Unknown gas state at time of penetration.
Failure to limit dive to 'operational limits' of air (40msw). Unknown back-gas / END selection
Failure to be trained or exceeding the level of training. Tick. No evidence of appropriate training utilized in this dive.
Failure to carry minimum 3 lights. Unknown. Lights of limited impact in a confined environment silt-out scenario.
Solo Overhead Diving. Tick. No timely search and rescue was conducted by supporting divers.
Andy, I don't want to detract from a great analysis, but as is frequently the case here on SB, these are based on best guess conjecture. The community has gone very quiet on this one, so I just can't seem to get more info yet.
From what we conclusively know;
Failure to use a continuous guideline. Probably based on evidence before us.
Failure to use 'Rule of Thirds. Unknown gas plan. Unknown gas state at time of penetration.
Failure to limit dive to 'operational limits' of air (40msw). Not a problem; wreck lies shallower than 40msw.
Failure to be trained or exceeding the level of training. Probably based on the choices made during the dive. We can conclusively say they exceed their skill level.
Failure to carry minimum 3 lights. Unknown. Lights of limited impact in a confined environment silt-out scenario.
Solo Overhead Diving. I'm not convinced Shek said this. Buddy separation is a risk of buddy diving. That it occurred in a wreck means the training and skills of all three divers involved is questionable.
I'm honestly quite (pleasantly) surprised at the amount of info that's been made public so soon after the incident. I imagine more will come out, either publicly or within the community when the incident is a little less raw. Although I don't think it will address this incident directly, I'm looking forward to reading Grant from Blue Flash's* article on safety that he mentioned in his last newsletter.
*For the non-Capetonians, they're another (quite well-respected) dive op.
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