Fire on dive boat Conception in CA

[MaxBottomtime]

Since the discussion has expanded into the duties of crew and even the responsibilities of a DM on deck of a day boat, if the DM does not receive any pay from the owner/operator of the vessel, could it be considered a volunteer position and thus exempt from liability?

What if they receive only "tips" and no formal pay, does accepting tips matter at all in this regard?

On the boats I worked on as a DM, I was not part of the crew. I was a representative of the shop that chartered the boat, and therefore not included in any pay nor tips. I received "free boat rides" as compensation for my 12-30 hours of work. I sometimes got a dive in while on the boat.

 

[PDX Diver]

I've read they did a night dive that evening, which would have guaranteed virtually everything would depleted and charging for the next morning. They were not scheduled to return until 5:00 so they would be diving. Most would be downloading and reviewing their footage and photos before going to bed, so everything would have been plugged in to charge late in the evening. There has also been a growing trend towards "fast charging" that would increase the load on the electrical system as compared to past demands.

 

[markmud]

I'm starting to see some crazy expectations. You seriously wanted a second watchman on the stern of the boat? Why not a third in the sleeping quarters? Should they all be in full turn out gear as well?

Wait until the flipping report is out. This is starting to sound like new car shopping, where the quantity of air bags is listed but the quality of the air bags is not. Look honey, this one has 18 airbags, the other one only has 14. More must be better.

Until this accident happened, NONE of this stuff was a problem. If it was such a problem, why was it not addressed before the accident? Obviously everyone who ever used these boats in the nearly 40 years they have been running is at fault for not reporting these glaring issues.

Hi Bronco,

While I agree in general with what you have written, the issues that cerich, wookie, (et allia) and I are discussing are well established because people have already died over these issues with one exception--the proliferation of battery charging, especially Lithium Ion batteries--it is a relatively new issue for shipboard proactive management.

The degree of regimentation in the navy, the merchant marine, even aviation, and USCG is very high because we (as a community) have dealt with these issues before.

Complacency and interpretation is the issue that we are focusing on. If all of the rules and best practices had been followed to a "T", maybe this disaster would not have happened.

Try following all of the rules in real life--it is very difficult. It's the one you miss that will get-ya!

markm

 

[NickB-LA]

There is always going to be a criminal investigation when there are so many deaths. As someone else said, you can't turn back time to collect evidence if the assumption is that there was no fault. But if you investigate like a crime and it turns out not to be, no harm done.
.

As I said, I understand why from the investigative standpoint it is necessary. My point was in regards to the number of people who instantly assumed something criminal must have happened.

 

[Kelp Boy]

I don’t feel that it is appropriate to assign “proper lookout” requirements to what is essentually a roving watch or a messenger of the watch. When at anchor, a navigational lookout is neither set nor necessary, as it is unlikely in the extreme that someone would run into a well lit vessel in an anchorage, but certainly not beyond the realm of possibility. These boats operate with 6-10 crew, all but one of whom has duties during the day, so the night watch will be either the navigator/proper lookout or will be the rover.

FYI. The Truth Aquatics boat Vision was hit by a National Park Service boat while anchored at night off San Miguel on September 12, 2003. No injuries, no structural damage.

 

[cerich]

Thanks,

If the operator is using the crew member to comply with staffing requirements, does that necessitate payment of said "crewman"? Sorry to ask so many questions.

No, but training etc as per regulations apply, so having conducted man overboard training etc has occurred.

 

[Akimbo]

It will be interesting to see if a full-scale burn test will be performed, as speculated on some media outlets. I doubt that it will be possible to definitively determine the ignition source and exact location but rates of temperature change, atmospheric chemical changes over time, and video would be applicable to other vessels. The data would not be dramatically impacted by the source of combustion beyond the time to reach a critical point. You are in big trouble once wood and fiberglass start to burn.

I suspect that the industry will take unmandated steps to manage potential Lithium battery failure long before the NTSB's report is published. I also think that a lot of WiFi and hardwire-based smoke-detecting video cameras will be installed.

On a side-note, we installed a bunch of surveillance-style low-light video cameras on the M/V Freedom. It is really nice to monitor the engine room, shaft seals, habitable compartents, dive deck, and the bow/anchor from the wheelhouse. We even made a housing for one camera on a long cable that can be lowered over the side and stuffed in tight spaces that are too small to get your head in. The video is recorded, mostly to monitor for theft and vandalism in port.

 

[pauldw]

From July/August “Dive “Training,” p. 8, quoting Mr. Rogers (who knew stuff): “When I was a boy and I would see scary things in the news, my mother would say to me, ‘Look for the helpers. You will always find people who are helping.’ If you look for the helpers you will know there’s hope.”

 

[markmud]

FYI. The Truth Aquatics boat Vision was hit by a National Park Service boat while anchored at night off San Miguel on September 12, 2003. No injuries, no structural damage.

Hi Kelp Boy,

Do you know if the anchor watch/nav watch onboard Vision sounded the Navigation Rules and Regulations prescribed sound signal for such an imminent situation? The jargon term for this sound signal is the "danger signal". Rule 34 states that 5 short and rapid blast of the ship's whistle is used to signal doubt to an approaching vessel that they are providing sufficient action to avoid collision. There is no prohibition for using the "danger signal" while at anchor.

Some may accuse me of beating a dead horse here, but an anchor watch/nav watch has Navigational Rule duties requiring diligence requiring a 360 degree by sight and hearing capability.

markm

 

[Joneill]

Until this accident happened, NONE of this stuff was a problem. If it was such a problem, why was it not addressed before the accident? Obviously everyone who ever used these boats in the nearly 40 years they have been running is at fault for not reporting these glaring issues.

I fully agree that we should wait until the report is out to decide exact actions. However, it is already quite clear that standards likely need to be changed on ALL liveaboards!

The density of divers below deck and the emergency egress methods/locations on this vessel give me pause (and scare me) - as others have said, it was not a setup likely to provide a good outcome if and when sh_t hit the fan. Of course, hindsight is always 20/20 - but it's pretty clear, if one is being honest, that the boat configuration was far from ideal if anything requiring a rapid evacuation ever went down!

The answers to your question in bold above are many, but likely include:

- If it was "good enough" for years, folks are usually unwilling to invest to make changes on something that has not been viewed as a problem. That is, until something catastrophic happens and forces analysis on what went wrong and how it can be prevented. Heck, hydrogen airships were quite common and had a poor track record - but no real action happened until the Hindenburg disaster:

Hydrogen Airship Disasters | Airships.net

- Changing Tech adds risks that may not be well understood. Regardless of the true root cause of this tragedy, it is clear to me that lithium ion batteries and chargers in common use these days present a potential fire risk that may not be properly understood and accounted for on liveaboards (new and old). In fact, it's caused me to rethink where I store and how/where/when I charge Li-ion batteries at home. As tech changes, risk assessments should be more commonly used to determine if changes are warranted.

- Simple economics - many ops likely operate on slim margins and may be hard pressed to spend $ on refitting boats, especially if divers are unwilling to pay for extra safety! On that note, I'm continually amazed at posts I see here with divers trying to pinch pennies on equipment that their lives depend on - so I'd bet that cost pressures are very real for ops!

As 34 people lost their lives in this accident, I hope that we can truly learn from it and make changes that prevent a reoccurrence - even if it means new restrictions and higher costs!