NTSB CONCEPTION HEARING - THIS TUESDAY @ 10AM

[HalcyonDaze]

And yes, I have to admit that historically, any reforms or improvement in safety for US vessels (and other countries' too) have followed a major casualty, and don't precede it. So yes, as one earlier commenter here has said, in general the marine safety regulations are indeed "written in blood". Why don't see ahead to that accident waiting to happen? I can't answer that. Maybe a sociologist (or in some cases an accountant) can?

Let's look at the record, at least what I remember or learned, about improvements that resulted from a particular tragedy on the water:

Back in the 1860s, the (overloaded) passenger riverboat SULTANA, awful fire and great loss of life after a boiler explosion: -- Licensing of Engineers, and improvements in boiler safety valves.

1903, the passenger boat GENERAL SLOCUM in New York, fire causing over 1000 deaths. -- improvements in fire equipment and hoses, and inspection standards.

1912, TITANIC, improvement in watertight compartment standards, International Ice Patrol established, radiotelegraph requirements, and of course, enough lifeboats for all passengers and crew.

1934, Passenger liner MORRO CASTLE, caught fire (probably arson) and burned through during a storm, grounded on a New Jersey beach, 137 deaths. ---no more beautiful (but flammable) wood-construction interiors; fire-resistant materials required thereafter, and alarms rather than relying solely on fire watch rounds-makers, at least for US liners.

1956, ANDREA DORIA / STOCKHOLM collision in fog, DORIA sank, 46 deaths: -- advancements in radar plotting and radar use, establishment of shipping lanes in areas of traffic convergence.


There are a whole lot more. Yes, "if only" we had forseen and regulated-in-advance preventive measures, instead of afterward. We may add "Conception" to this list now, albeit for a very small number of vessels. New regs coming (I believe there's already a pro-forma bill in the House?), but short-term, night watchstanders actually being there, and being watchstanders--and walkers.

I'll touch on the money angle tangentially, but there are also some other factors. Several of the disasters you cited happened during extremely lax regulatory periods. Nobody was held accountable for the Sultana and while eight were indicted for the General Slocum fire, only the captain was found guilty on a single charge of criminal negligence - and he was only sentenced to 10 years in prison, being paroled after three and pardoned after Theodore Roosevelt left office. In both cases, that kind of who-GAS safety attitude was par for the course across society. Remember, that was also the era of the Iroquois Theater and Triangle Shirtwaist Factory fires, and even after those disasters spurred a few changes it would be another 30-40 years or so before the Cocoanut Grove fire really prompted more widespread fire safety regulations. Even then, we still have mass-casualty fires to this day where existing regulations are not enforced or don't cover the situation in question.

There is also the issue of technology advancing faster than the regulations. One of the factors in the Titanic disaster was that the British Board of Trade regulations required vessels over 10,000 tons to carry 16 lifeboats with a capacity of 990 occupants. Those regulations were written before there were 50,000-ton ocean liners with capacity for over 2,000 passengers and crew and were never updated, and in any case it was thought that in the age of wireless a ship would sink slowly enough for help to arrive and relegate the lifeboats to use as ferries to rescue ships. More relevant to this discussion, the proliferation of modern electronics has gotten to a point where even a 1970s-design Nimitz-class supercarrier with a pair of 100 MW nuclear reactors has issues with modern "hotel loads" (electrical demand on habitable spaces). For me, the biggest red flag I've seen out of the Conception exhibits was the jury-rigged wiring and power strips for electrical loads that an early 1980s boat was never made to support.

Finally, there's what I call the "is this really necessary/inconvenience/conflict" factor, which can be financial. Let's say at some point before last year, you had a boat with a very thorough roving watch making the rounds through all compartments including the berthing spaces. After enough complaints from light sleepers about the crewman clomping past or overhead several times during the night, the likelihood of a fast-moving fire at night might get weighed against those complaints (especially if the Coast Guard hasn't cited a vessel for lack of a roving patrol in 30+ years). On a more serious note, as has been stated a refitted escape like the one on the Vision might run afoul of other regulations, and whichever one is more consistently enforced/carries greater penalties prevails.

I will also say that in my recent work experience, corporate safety people tend to be more focused on maintaining a paper trail against lawsuits than actually making useful suggestions - my crown jewel was after taking a very minor stingray hit in the ankle, our corporate safety officer asked why we didn't wear steel-toed or otherwise protective boots while wading. Cue sarcastic explanation of how one can drown in chest-deep water while wearing 2.5-pound boots on a soft substrate (hilariously, the "Ray-Guard" boots they made us buy afterwards have a tiny little mesh drain hole ... about an inch from the exact location where I got jabbed). More recently we were pestered about having to maintain heat stress and stepback forms while simultaneously being pressured to dive in conditions I balked at (low viz, strong tidal exchange, repetitive dives past 30 ft, and heavy traffic from jetskis to container ships) and throw divers at the project who hadn't done work dives before or yet received their medical clearance. If the regulations aren't written in spilled blood, they're written by people afraid of spilling blood and not afraid to raise hell about it.

Also, as Ken Kurtis has repeatedly pointed out, whatever regs come out of this are not going to just apply to a "relatively small number of vessels" - it should apply to every similarly engaged passenger vessel such as overnight recreational fishing vessels. That the Conception was specifically engaged in diving is irrelevant to the matter.

 

[Rick Brant]

Seems unlikely that a crew member would have needed to "clomp past" to notice that a major portion of the vessel was on fire. There is a massive gulf between no watch and a roving or clomping watch IMO. I can't get past that issue myself. No watch is a major mistake on all levels.

 

[Michael3826]

Also, digest this comment from NTSB Chairman Robert Sumwalt in a post-hearing media release: "The Conception may have passed all Coast Guard inspections, but that did not make it safe." That does not exactly give me great comfort about the efficacy of USCG regs under which boats are built and operate.

@kenkurtis
Oh man. Only taking the portion of the quote that supports your homie.
Shame, shame, again.
here’s the full quote.

“The Conception may have passed all Coast Guard inspections, but that did not make it safe,” NTSB Chairman Robert L. Sumwalt said. “Our new recommendations will make these vessels safer, but there is no rule change that can replace human vigilance.”

NTSB knows that no rule can make anything safe. You can have seat belts in your car, a speed limit, and lanes on the road. But if you fall asleep at the wheel, and kill someone... well then, who’s at fault? The driver who fell asleep and hit someone. That’s who.

34 lives depended on one awake person.
ONE AWAKE PERSON.

the owner, captain, and crew failed time and time again to operate safely. They just never got caught. that doesn’t make them a safe and outstanding company. That makes them lucky and liars. They have been lying to their customers and to the diving industry as a whole for decades.
It makes anyone who continues to support them a fool too.
A coward for refusing to admit they were wrong.
Everyone should have courage to stand up against them and tell them they were wrong. They did a bad job and they should take fault for it and their friends should be the first to tell them they f-ed up. that’s what a friend does.

Anyone continuing to go out on live aboard as should heavily question their operation. He’ll, maybe bring your own safety gear.

according to NTSBs meeting on oct 20 it sounded like they described a crew member dropped down to the main deck, went from the bow to the stern on the port side, saw the salon doors were blocked, then went back to the bow, passing on the port side again. If that’s true then that crew me never walked past the fire hose twice. It was on the port side and the one on the deck with the on/off valve. Again, If it’s true, a crew member went pst the hose twice and didn’t think to use it. Or didn’t know to use it because 3 of the 5 had never done a fire drill with truth aquatics.

As I said before, coast guard regulations and boat construction do not keep ships safe. People do.

one person. That’s all 34 lives needed. Just one.

 

[Wookie]

@kenkurtis
Oh man. Only taking the portion of the quote that supports your homie.
Shame, shame, again.
here’s the full quote.

“The Conception may have passed all Coast Guard inspections, but that did not make it safe,” NTSB Chairman Robert L. Sumwalt said. “Our new recommendations will make these vessels safer, but there is no rule change that can replace human vigilance.”

NTSB knows that no rule can make anything safe. You can have seat belts in your car, a speed limit, and lanes on the road. But if you fall asleep at the wheel, and kill someone... well then, who’s at fault? The driver who fell asleep and hit someone. That’s who.

34 lives depended on one awake person.
ONE AWAKE PERSON.

the owner, captain, and crew failed time and time again to operate safely. They just never got caught. that doesn’t make them a safe and outstanding company. That makes them lucky and liars. They have been lying to their customers and to the diving industry as a whole for decades.
It makes anyone who continues to support them a fool too.
A coward for refusing to admit they were wrong.
Everyone should have courage to stand up against them and tell them they were wrong. They did a bad job and they should take fault for it and their friends should be the first to tell them they f-ed up. that’s what a friend does.

Anyone continuing to go out on live aboard as should heavily question their operation. He’ll, maybe bring your own safety gear.

according to NTSBs meeting on oct 20 it sounded like they described a crew member dropped down to the main deck, went from the bow to the stern on the port side, saw the salon doors were blocked, then went back to the bow, passing on the port side again. If that’s true then that crew me never walked past the fire hose twice. It was on the port side and the one on the deck with the on/off valve. Again, If it’s true, a crew member went pst the hose twice and didn’t think to use it. Or didn’t know to use it because 3 of the 5 had never done a fire drill with truth aquatics.

As I said before, coast guard regulations and boat construction do not keep ships safe. People do.

one person. That’s all 34 lives needed. Just one.

I think your point has been made.

 

[KevinNM]

I’m unconvinced that a crewman hanging out on the bridge would have been sure to notice it in time. The guy who noticed the fire saw the glow from the back of the boat, which you don’t seem to have visibility to from the bridge. But they certainly might have noticed it in time to matter.

If someone was looking in all but the the passenger berthing every 15 minutes they would have probably caught it fast enough to have a better outcome.

But maybe not. It’s very unclear to me how long it would have taken to build to the point it was at the time it was discovered. It could have been more than thirty minutes or it could have been more like five minutes. Given the multiple possible ignition sources it can’t be determined. So even with a roving watch I think it’s possible the same chain of events would have played out.

 

[Michael3826]

I think your point has been made.

i doubt it.

 

[Rick Brant]

One other thing that jumps out at me is that the captain and crew cannot be relied upon at all. It does not make sense that they retired to another craft and then watched the boat burn for hours. Even the radio operator at the time was confused by that scenario.

 

[chris kippax]

One other thing that jumps out at me is that the captain and crew cannot be relied upon at all. It does not make sense that they retired to another craft and then watched the boat burn for hours. Even the radio operator at the time was confused by that scenario.

What do you suggest they do? Die?
They had no access to fire fighting equipment and the boat was ablaze.
What would have you done? Never judge peoples reactions to life or death scenarios. You have no idea how you would of reacted with the same scenario.

 

[Wookie]

i doubt it.

Than let me be succinct. Your posts are on the edge of being a personal attack on Ken. Personal attacks are not tolerated. Can I make it any clearer for you? There are special rules for the A&I forum.

I personally lost 2 friends and a crewmember in that fire, but I don’t go around attacking the local guy who is working hard to get the rest of us the whole story. If you don’t like the message or the forum it’s presented in, pass on by.

 

[Gareth J]

I watched the NTSB meeting with a very poor connection, so missed some sections (i was also working).

There where two things that jumped out at me.

1. The failure to have a roving patrol.
This is not a new regulation, it is not a technology based regulation.
It is a simple and effective safety check. Not just for fire, but for flooding, dragged anchors, navigation light failure, etc.

I have spent nights on board a boat where it is moored at the harbour wall or dock, where there are no crew or skipper on board. I am not sure if the boat being moored changed the requirements for a roving patrol.
I will point out that UK dive boats are restricted to 12 passengers + crew.


2. Electrical safety.
We all use far more electrical equipment now, than previously.
After diving, I charge my torch, the camera batteries, the strobe batteries. Potentially the batteries in the CCR.
That does not include personal devices, laptops, phones, etc.

Most of these device are plugged in and left to charge, either overnight, a lot of boats stop the generators overnight, this means people leave devices charging whilst they are diving, or whilst eating.

Lithium batteries are appearing in all types of devices. Many people have no idea what battery type is powering a device.
As was pointed out by the NTSB, Lithium battery fires present challenges for fire fighters/ prevention.


Point 1. Is easiest to solve. No boat modifications. Just a crew member carrying out a duty they should already be aware of and practicing.

Point 2. This in my mind is more complicated. Many people charge devices/batteries in their accommodation (partly for convenience, partly so they don't lose items, partly because of the lack of electrical outlets in the communal areas). I have been on some boats that have a 'charging area', in the Red Sea those have been outside on/near the dive deck, they also double as the 'camera' area.
It is noticeable, that electrical capacity for charging devices is alway limited (under capacity). I try to carry a multi block /extension lead, to give me more sockets.
The other complication, when travelling, is that people are more likely to be using adapters, to allow their electrical plug to fit the local socket. (Another reason for the extension block - but then one adapter is powering multiple devices! - in the worst case, extension blocks are 'daisy chained' back to one adapter.)

Electrically, phone chargers etc are not consuming a lot of power. So it is seldom a power issue, even with multiple extension blocks plugged in [1]. It is more the condition of the sockets and adapters (and plugs). They are often worn-out, poor mechanical connection. Probably the constant insertion and removal of plugs, with the marine environment are not helping (And the wedging of incorrect plugs into local sockets)[2].

30 years ago we where charging our torches, that was probably it. Now, we have a ton of personal electronics, and diving electronics. Facilities on boats have been slow to catch up.

Space on boats is always a premium. A dedicated charging area may present a challenge.
If there is a dedicated area. Metal surfaces would dissipate heat and reduce the risk of ignition (metal is a conductor - so presents other risks). Adequate power outlets, locally protected (circuit breakers). Local smoke / heat detectors. Potentially, cameras linked to the bridge.
Even a dedicated area may present a challenge to customers, would they leave expensive personal electronics unsupervised in a public area?


[1] The Weakness of 110V ac systems is that you are drawing a lot more current Watt for Watt when compared with the European 220/240V ac system. Thus overheating is more of an issue on low voltage systems.

[2] This is incidental. When I'm in the USA, I regularly have issues with poor electrical connections when I plug into the wall outlet. The number of times a phone has failed to charge or the laptop has been on battery are significant. Is thus my failing or a known problem?