DumpsterDiver emergency ascent from 180'

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Both the Challenger and Columbia accidents were examples of Normalization of Deviance. There were 4 known bipod ramp foam losses prior to the loss of Columbia, and often the shuttle had minor foam strikes during ascent over the history of the program, but because nothing bad happened foam strikes had been accepted as all perfectly safe. This was despite foam strikes on the TPS being classified as a major issue formally.

For at least one of them, the one caused by faulty seals, the engineers and technical people were highly nervous and raised concerns. They had not launched in temps that cold. The actual go ahead any way despite the colder temps was made because of management pressure to keep the turn around time between launches shorter for political reasons.
 
Had DD been free diving near that depth, having a 2l bailout along would seem excessive...
I'm guessing he has a pretty accurate assessment of his ability by now.
 
For at least one of them, the one caused by faulty seals, the engineers and technical people were highly nervous and raised concerns. They had not launched in temps that cold. The actual go ahead any way despite the colder temps was made because of management pressure to keep the turn around time between launches shorter for political reasons.
With Columbia the NASA safety people had formally requested NRO to get them pictures of the shuttle TPS is orbit, which would have shown the damage if it is what it we believe at this point. Shuttle mission manager Linda Ham ordered that imaging to not be performed. I remember the press conference after Columbia broke up, with Dittimore not yet seeming to grasp what had happened and how it was that what people had worried about had happened.
 
And there was no fix to the leading edge that could have been done and no way to get the shuttle home without it burning up... They were dead 30 seconds after lift-off... They just didn't know it...

Jim...
 
To put this 'discussion' into some perspective, I think there is reason and merit on both sides of the dialog. Nonetheless, since the UA DC-10 crash was brought into the discussion, and some of the details of the flight and aircraft history have been presented, I think it might be useful to also present some of the NTSB Report material.
edit to add this...United Airlines Flight 232 was en route from Denver, Colorado to Philadelphia, Pennsylvania with a planned stop in Chicago, Illinois. The plane was a McDonnell Douglas DC-10 with three General Electric engines, one on each wing and one mounted in the tail structure (Figure 1). The tail mounted engine (engine #2) had no previously recorded problems and had been inspected approximately one year prior to the crash. The engine had already undergone five other inspections and was 1,101 take-off/landing cycles below the mandatory engine lifetime maximum of 18,000 cycles. While the engine was over fifteen years old, it was compliant with Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) standards.
And, the NTSB Probable Cause finding was: THE INADEQUATE CONSIDERATION GIVEN TO HUMAN FACTORS LIMITATIONS IN THE INSPECTION AND QUALITY CONTROL PROCEDURES USED BY UNITED AIRLINES' ENGINE OVERHAUL FACILITY WHICH RESULTED IN THE FAILURE TO DETECT A FATIGUE CRACK ORIGINATING FROM A PREVIOUSLY UNDETECTED METALLURGICAL DEFECT LOCATED IN A CRITICAL AREA OF THE STAGE.

And, the specific Findings included:
2. (C) MAINTENANCE,OVERHAUL,MAJOR - INADEQUATE - COMPANY MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL
3. (C) INADEQUATE QUALITY CONTROL - MANUFACTURER

Now, as a pilot as well, I recognize and acknowledge that NTSB never wants to end an investigation with a Probable Cause / Finding that amounts to 'S**t Happens'. So, assigning responsibility to someone or thing is a preferable outcome. And, hindsight is always wonderful. But the finding was inadequate inspection and QC procedures, on the part of UA and the manufacturer, not inadequate FAA standards., and not 'Sometimes Things Fail for No Reason'.

From my perspective, if I wanted to use a major airliner crash to make a point about the critical contributions of human factors and poor maintenance / service to disasterous outcomes, I might have chosen AA191 in Chicago. But, that is just my opinion.
 
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Another fact to consider is that few such incidents have video published. DD dives often, and I surmise that he records video for every dive.
And doesn't mind posting the problems that occur.
 
Excellent point! My comparison being the driver dashcam videos are predominantly from countries where dashcams are most common. Not evidence those countries have the most incidents.

Personal illustration: I don't have any interesting diver behavior on film because I don't keep a camera rolling when things go pearshape underwater. I do hope diver body cams become fashionable for accident analysis and as this thread shows the results can be of great interest.

Having the fortitude to upload a video is also another consideration. The feeding frenzy can be intense. My SM cave diving friend took down a video him navigating a tight restriction after getting fired from a shop and receiving death threats on social media (ironically really)
The fact those come from countries with lots of dashcams may well be evidence that those countries have the most incidents. They believe they need them to protect themselves.
 

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