Conception Captain Found Guilty of Manslaughter

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Sprinkler systems and Fire detection systems are cheap and simple, seriously, WTF.
The fire-alert system would be insanely cheap, from a business-cost perspective. You might want something better than these off-the-shelf systems, but even still, one of these systems would have been better than nothing.


The sprinkler system would be a little more expensive, but it's absolutely insane they didn't have the integrated alert system.
I was on the Conception on a multi day trip
I'd be curious about what it was like on the boat, from people who have been on it.
When the owner or charterer of any steamboat or vessel is a corporation, any executive officer of such corporation, for the time being actually charged with the control and management of the operation, equipment, or navigation of such steamboat or vessel, who has knowingly and willfully caused or allowed such fraud, neglect, connivance, misconduct, or violation of law, by which the life of any person is destroyed, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both.

_________________________________________________________________________________________________

Per the above, the Captain was certainly guilty. I wonder, upon reading the statute, whether they now will also go after the owner.
I've been hammering on this point over-and-over. While the captain certainly seems to have a strong case for neglect, in terms of whose actions can be directly traced to the deaths, only the owner could have installed the escape hatches, fire-alert, and fire-safety systems. Even the presence of safety-drill, negligent crew, and inadequate crew can be pointed back at the owner.

The captain's negligence, I'd say was the lack of safety procedures and briefings. The patrols probably wouldn't have caught the fire. The captain couldn't have put out the fire by the time it was discovered.
The captain's actions once the fire was already well underway are irrelevant in this case as it certainly appears there was nothing he could have done once he was awakened to affect the outcome. It's what he should have done before the fire that matters. But apparently it's easier to sell a story of cowardice than one of failing to fulfill professional duties.
That's my read as well. Maybe he's a coward, etc, but once the crew discovers the fire, there's little they can do to save the passengers. Maybe if they were better trained, drilled, etc, and there was a patrol there might have been a chance. (Though I think only an actual fire-alert and escape-route could have actually saved the passengers).
This may be the hardest comment I've ever read on ScubaBoard.
A close friend and dive-buddy, had 2 close friends die on that boat. It still hits him hard.
That's how the term "Maritime regulations are written in blood" came about.
Same with many scuba safety and redundancy procedures and training.
I suspect the owners would have pulled the Conception from service rather than make those kinds of changes to a 50yo hull given the high likelihood that they'd never recoup that investment.
I'm sure some people would say that's a good thing.

I think the investments which could easily be recovered are more (a) escape-hatches (b) an integrated fire-alert system, (c) more fire-extinguishers (d) safety procedures and briefings for passengers.

I wouldn't be surprised if one of the reasons (d) safety briefings never happened, is because they (including the owner) knew in case of a fire or sinking, the lower-bunk area was a death-trap.

Fire-suppression systems or using different materials would be far more expensive
 
I'm sure some people would say that's a good thing.

I think the investments which could easily be recovered are more (a) escape-hatches (b) an integrated fire-alert system, (c) more fire-extinguishers (d) safety procedures and briefings for passengers.

I wouldn't be surprised if one of the reasons (d) safety briefings never happened, is because they (including the owner) knew in case of a fire or sinking, the lower-bunk area was a death-trap.

Fire-suppression systems or using different materials would be far more expensive

Sure in hindsight. But there's a ton of catawalling about charters going under still even with a tragedy like this
 
The patrols probably wouldn't have caught the fire. The captain couldn't have put out the fire by the time it was discovered.
So you don't think the roving watch would have caught the fire, so it wasn't important that he didn't have one? Does that mean you think the rule should be eliminated? I mean, if it doesn't do any good, why have it?

It seems more like to me that the roving watch WOULD have caught the fire in time to fight it. Even with it not being cause, the passengers were fully alive at least three minutes AFTER the captain made the mayday all and left the ship.

Even without the early warning from a roving watch, the crew could have doused the fire with the fire hoses and maybe gotten the passengers out--they were alive when the crew was on deck. They couldn't do it, though, because the captain had never given them the required training.

But, go ahead, absolve the captain of all blame. It sounds like you see him as a victim.
 
Sure in hindsight. But there's a ton of catawalling about charters going under still even with a tragedy like this
Hindsight bias is hard to eliminate. I've watched/listened a couple murder-trials, and found it interesting how much focus can be put on irrelevancies, such as some obviously out-of-context text message or social media post. Or how the events that happened in less than a second are analyzed millisecond by millisecond from 5 camera angles.

That's why I've mostly focused on fire-alert systems and multiple escape routes, and given little attention to "Captain jumped in the water!" The lack of safety briefings, patrols, etc is more compelling when compared to standard procedures, laws, or regulations, which I'd guess is the reason for the guilty verdict.
So you don't think the roving watch would have caught the fire, so it wasn't important that he didn't have one? Does that mean you think the rule should be eliminated? I mean, if it doesn't do any good, why have it?

It seems more like to me that the roving watch WOULD have caught the fire in time to fight it. Even with it not being cause, the passengers were fully alive at least three minutes AFTER the captain made the mayday all and left the ship.

Even without the early warning from a roving watch, the crew could have doused the fire with the fire hoses and maybe gotten the passengers out--they were alive when the crew was on deck. They couldn't do it, though, because the captain had never given them the required training.

But, go ahead, absolve the captain of all blame. It sounds like you see him as a victim.
To be more precise, it's not a reliable method.

As described in the other thread, these patrols are usually once per hour. Therefore, a patrol might have caught the fire anywhere between 0-to-60 minutes after it started. Lets say the patrol spots the fire 25 minutes after it started. Is that enough time to save everyone? Maybe. It's not reliable enough, because if I'm one of those passengers, I don't want a 50% (perhaps more, perhaps less) chance of getting out, I want a 99.9% chance of getting out.

My point is that the patrols are not sufficient and reliable, and that the owner should also be on trial.
But, go ahead, absolve the captain of all blame. It sounds like you see him as a victim.
You are misinterpreting me. That is not my intention. Maybe I didn't communicate clearly, however, I am NOT absolving him from responsibility.
 
As described in the other thread, these patrols are usually once per hour.
Who defined that? Is it a rule?

Read it all again. I think you will find that the overall belief is highly influenced by Ken's very, very desperate attempt to not only absolve the captain, but to nominate him for sainthood. Not only is a roving watch supposed to be, well, "roving," in a boat the size of the Conception, if he is sitting on his duff the whole time, he should be able to spot a problem from his chair, certainly before the flames get 15 feet tall.
 
Read it all again. I think you will find that the overall belief is highly influenced by Ken's very, very desperate attempt to not only absolve the captain, but to nominate him for sainthood. Not only is a roving watch supposed to be, well, "roving," in a boat the size of the Conception, if he is sitting on his duff the whole time, he should be able to spot a problem from his chair, certainly before the flames get 15 feet tall.
:popcorn:
 
As described in the other thread, these patrols are usually once per hour. Therefore, a patrol might have caught the fire anywhere between 0-to-60 minutes after it started. Lets say the patrol spots the fire 25 minutes after it started. Is that enough time to save everyone? Maybe. It's not reliable enough, because if I'm one of those passengers, I don't want a 50% (perhaps more, perhaps less) chance of getting out, I want a 99.9% chance of getting out.

I ask the same question where does the watch stander go between rounds? Disappear into the multiverse with all the good writers? We aren't talking about a 300ft freighter with the fire started in some machinery space buried deep within the ship. This is a small dive boat with the fire starting in one of the most central spaces on the boat.

Yes a better escape hatch and fire detection systems are better, but that doesn't mean that the captain is any less responsible.
 
I think you will find that the overall belief is highly influenced by Ken's very, very desperate attempt to not only absolve the captain, but to nominate him for sainthood.

If I interpreted correctly, Ken tried to act from a 'presumption of innocence' perspective, and guardedly work from there, interpreting evidence skeptically to proceed toward making an ultimate conclusion guided by objective interpretation of available evidence (while mindful of its limits). Sometimes that means taking a contrarian approach to a point in an effort to make sure all reasonable possibilities are considered. It's also about limiting conclusions of guilt to things actually done wrong (i.e.: not having a roving night watch, which he should've done, as opposed to fighting the fire when it was too far gone to save anyone). In other words, a deliberate adherence to precise deliberation.

Granted, these threads on ScubaBoard aren't the trial and none of us are on the jury or instructed in how to consider the matter by the judge. But we are having a public discussion about a real person in a serious legal situation.

When guilt seems obvious it can be frustrating when someone insists on examining the matter from a 'defense' perspective.

I, too, have proceeded skeptically, not because I thought Boylan was innocent, but because I don't want to rush to judgment, or join in condemning him for more than what he's guilty of (which seems to be plenty).
 
Roving watches are an 18th century solution to an eternal problem. In those days, a fire was far less likely to go from incipient to life threatening within an hour and it is likely a roving watch would catch it and raise the alarm. That said. We are no longer in the 18th century, we are firmly in the 21st. With new furnishings and materials of constructuon, a fire can go from ignition to flashover in 3-4 minutes. Reliable, effective fire detection systems have existed since the early 1900s, as have sprinkler systems which are extremely effective at slowing fire growth and saving lives. The oft-quoted statistic is that there has never been a fire in a sprinklered structire (on land) in which more than one person died. None of this is new. Every single one of these systems existed when the Conception was built.

I think a portion of the blame belongs with the USCG for not requiring more modern, effective fire detection and protection systems on overnight boats. At a minimum they should have enforced their own existing, ineffective rules requiring a roving watch.

I know this is going to be an unpopular opinion, but here goes...

Government does not exist to protect business. It exists to protect citizens from business. If every overnight charter boat goes out of business because they cannot offer a reasonable level of safety from predictable hazards, then that is not the government's concern. What is the government's concern is that people not die trapped below decks in a fire that is not detected until it is too late.
 

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