I can't quote the statistics but my insurance company raised my risk level for horse riding, and not for diving. According to the CEO of this company horse riding is much more dangerous than diving. And this is based on the Allianz data.
Scuba Safety record question
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What Herman said, though getting in to trouble underwater is a lot more unforgiving than most automobile accidents. Also, equipment failure underwater is a lot more serious than motor failure on the road. I don't know how many millions of miles I have driven over the 70 years that I have been around but I do know that I have only been in one major auto accident in which two people died and in which all I got was a skinned elbow. Probably because I was drunk and sleeping in the back seat.
Mania: In 1993 I bought a twenty acre plot which was being used as a training site for horses, half mile track, stablels, etc. When I went to get insurance the first thing that the guy asked is whether I intended to have horses, train horses or board them on this property. I wondered why he asked and he told me that the cost of my liability insurance would be three to four times higher than normal if I had horses around. ----------And here's another thing I ran across a few months ago. The question was asked how the majority of old time cowboys died and the answer was from falling off of their horse.
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- # of dives
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It is interesting to note that the ABACUS project came up with the same order of magnitude for recreational diving that we did with "back of the napkin" calculations that we made in the early 1980s, (105)
Research on instances that dive equipment was correlated to dive accidents (published by SPUMS):
1995:
An evaluation of buoyancy jacket safety in 1,000 diving incidents.
Rubicon Research Repository: Item 123456789/6288
File: SPUMS_V26N2_10.pdf
1999:
Equipment malfunction in 1,000 diving incidents.
Rubicon Research Repository: Item 123456789/6009
File: SPUMS_V29N3_2.pdf
2001
457 EQUIPMENT INCIDENT REPORTS
Rubicon Research Repository: Item 123456789/7743
File: SPUMS_V31N4_2.pdf
2002
Recreational scuba diving equipment problems, morbidity and mortality: an overview of the Diving Incident Monitoring Study and Project Stickybeak.
Rubicon Research Repository: Item 123456789/7761
file: SPUMS_V33N1_8.pdf
2003
Depth gauges, contents gauges and miscellaneous equipment problems reported in the Diving Incident Monitoring Study
Rubicon Research Repository: Item 123456789/7763
SPUMS_V33N1_10.pdf
Undercurrent newsletter synopsized the above reports:
2000-Feb; pages 5-6
Dive Gear and Dive Deaths - equipment problems? or diver error?
2002-April; pages 13-14
Equipment in Diver Accidents and Deaths; in 1,000 incidents, equipment was implicated in 457 (PART 1)
2002-June; pages 14-15
Equipment in Diver Accidents and Deaths; in 1,000 incidents, equipment was implicated in 457 (PART 2)
Undercurrent has reported research that finds inflator mechanisms of some BCDs problematic; per Undercurrent:
• Power inflators need a cutoff mechanism. [i.e. ball-valve]
• Co-location of the inflate and deflate mechanisms on the BCD’s inflator hose is ergonomically poor. Inflate and deflate mechanisms need to be separated.
Notably, Schrader valves for BC and dry suit inflation fail OPEN (i.e. not fail-safe). Yes, training teaches us to deal with this, as do risk-management seminars ("They were trained, weren't they?"). But why use downstream valves that fail-OPEN? Instead, upstream valves would fail SHUT to mitigate an out of control ascent of a BCD and reduce the risk of embolism to a newbie (oral inflators work fine). Dry suits could use ball-valves so you're not relying upon frigid fingers to have the dexterity to unhook an out-of-control inflator. KUDOS to Tobin for improving dive safety!
1995:
An evaluation of buoyancy jacket safety in 1,000 diving incidents.
Rubicon Research Repository: Item 123456789/6288
File: SPUMS_V26N2_10.pdf
1999:
Equipment malfunction in 1,000 diving incidents.
Rubicon Research Repository: Item 123456789/6009
File: SPUMS_V29N3_2.pdf
2001
457 EQUIPMENT INCIDENT REPORTS
Rubicon Research Repository: Item 123456789/7743
File: SPUMS_V31N4_2.pdf
2002
Recreational scuba diving equipment problems, morbidity and mortality: an overview of the Diving Incident Monitoring Study and Project Stickybeak.
Rubicon Research Repository: Item 123456789/7761
file: SPUMS_V33N1_8.pdf
2003
Depth gauges, contents gauges and miscellaneous equipment problems reported in the Diving Incident Monitoring Study
Rubicon Research Repository: Item 123456789/7763
SPUMS_V33N1_10.pdf
Undercurrent newsletter synopsized the above reports:
2000-Feb; pages 5-6
Dive Gear and Dive Deaths - equipment problems? or diver error?
2002-April; pages 13-14
Equipment in Diver Accidents and Deaths; in 1,000 incidents, equipment was implicated in 457 (PART 1)
2002-June; pages 14-15
Equipment in Diver Accidents and Deaths; in 1,000 incidents, equipment was implicated in 457 (PART 2)
Undercurrent has reported research that finds inflator mechanisms of some BCDs problematic; per Undercurrent:
• Power inflators need a cutoff mechanism. [i.e. ball-valve]
• Co-location of the inflate and deflate mechanisms on the BCD’s inflator hose is ergonomically poor. Inflate and deflate mechanisms need to be separated.
Notably, Schrader valves for BC and dry suit inflation fail OPEN (i.e. not fail-safe). Yes, training teaches us to deal with this, as do risk-management seminars ("They were trained, weren't they?"). But why use downstream valves that fail-OPEN? Instead, upstream valves would fail SHUT to mitigate an out of control ascent of a BCD and reduce the risk of embolism to a newbie (oral inflators work fine). Dry suits could use ball-valves so you're not relying upon frigid fingers to have the dexterity to unhook an out-of-control inflator. KUDOS to Tobin for improving dive safety!
Hang on a second here... I'm 54. My maximum, then would be 220 - 54 = 166. Multiply that by 0.5: --> 83. Then again by .8 gets me 66.4, which is lower than the normal resting heart rate. I think you meant "multiply by 0.5 to 0.8" which would get me a target range of 83 to 133.
captain
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I may be wrong but I believe most BC and dry suit inflators are upstream valves that stick open, mainly from lack of maintenance. A down stream valve could be forced open in the event of a free flowing 1st stage causing two problems at the same time.
Schrader valves in quick connects are up stream valves also.
I will agree the inflater/ dump valves are not ergonomic and could be improved.
In my opinion the old US Divers horse collar BC from the 1970's had one of the best inflation/dump system to date
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- Reaction score
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- # of dives
- 5000 - ∞
I don't purport to be a valve expert, but paraphrasing Supreme Court Justice Steward, "I know a valve problem when I see one." Others on SB certainly know their valves (from a current ongoing thread)...
If the industry cannot agree on "mastery" of mask clearing (some instructors are pressured to crank out divers fast, others are pressured to crank out safe divers), how is it possible for newbie divers to be trained in "mastery" of dealing with an out-of-control ascent that requires dexterity of both hands to unplug an inflator hose, while they may be simultaneously dealing with a slipping (i.e. defective) weight-release mechanism (and they're over-weighted to begin with) and they're fighting mild panicking which predictably reduces their manual dexterity?
Isn't responsible risk-management the building of overlapping safe-guards to address predictable mishaps? Standards of care in the dive industry moves 100% of responsibility (i.e. liability) to the diver, whenever possible. OK, that's half of legitimate risk-management (i.e. eliminating nuisance litigation). But the other half of risk-management is taking reasonable measures to reduce highly predictable occurrences of mishaps. Manufacturers dodge the liability-bullet when training agencies tell students that the solution is 100% up to them. Except Schrader valves are not self-cleaning, and they fail with predictable "reliability;" they were never intended to be used around sand and salt crystals. How is this not like Ford ignoring the dangerously positioned gas tanks in Pintos? Just because the training agencies tell you, "This is the way things have to be" (as they share industry profits).
NOBODY knows how pervasive this problem is, because data that was once collected after accidents has now been severely truncated.
To date, the complexity of litigating these issues in civil court, what some allege are corporations washing each others' unclean hands, makes recovery dubious for plaintiff attorneys. Dibble et al v. PADI, 1986 - 1991, was a civil RICO case that spanned 5 years and never got to trial. Per Dibble (phone conversation with me), recovery was doubtful when concentric corporate veils were discovered. The predicate of the case: Dibble and the other senior Course-Director-Trainers working with Dibble wanted to maintain high standards of who could become a Course Director. PADI wanted to lower the standards to grow the industry. PADI cancelled the contract with Dibble et al, who alleged in their RICO action that afterwards the fatality rate of PADI-trained divers increased disproportionately to PADI's market-share.
As I've mentioned in prior posts, the US Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission have investigated and prosecuted the dive industry in the '80's and '90's.
In this era of Bernie Madoff, Enron et al, has the pendulum swung around again for the dive industry? Prosecution under criminal RICO statutes cannot be dragged out for years, as can civil complaints.
Of course many are apprehensive about any government intervention into a free market. More evidence of patterns, history, harms - and what benefits could be achieved from an intervention - should be presented. More to come...
If the industry cannot agree on "mastery" of mask clearing (some instructors are pressured to crank out divers fast, others are pressured to crank out safe divers), how is it possible for newbie divers to be trained in "mastery" of dealing with an out-of-control ascent that requires dexterity of both hands to unplug an inflator hose, while they may be simultaneously dealing with a slipping (i.e. defective) weight-release mechanism (and they're over-weighted to begin with) and they're fighting mild panicking which predictably reduces their manual dexterity?
Isn't responsible risk-management the building of overlapping safe-guards to address predictable mishaps? Standards of care in the dive industry moves 100% of responsibility (i.e. liability) to the diver, whenever possible. OK, that's half of legitimate risk-management (i.e. eliminating nuisance litigation). But the other half of risk-management is taking reasonable measures to reduce highly predictable occurrences of mishaps. Manufacturers dodge the liability-bullet when training agencies tell students that the solution is 100% up to them. Except Schrader valves are not self-cleaning, and they fail with predictable "reliability;" they were never intended to be used around sand and salt crystals. How is this not like Ford ignoring the dangerously positioned gas tanks in Pintos? Just because the training agencies tell you, "This is the way things have to be" (as they share industry profits).
NOBODY knows how pervasive this problem is, because data that was once collected after accidents has now been severely truncated.
To date, the complexity of litigating these issues in civil court, what some allege are corporations washing each others' unclean hands, makes recovery dubious for plaintiff attorneys. Dibble et al v. PADI, 1986 - 1991, was a civil RICO case that spanned 5 years and never got to trial. Per Dibble (phone conversation with me), recovery was doubtful when concentric corporate veils were discovered. The predicate of the case: Dibble and the other senior Course-Director-Trainers working with Dibble wanted to maintain high standards of who could become a Course Director. PADI wanted to lower the standards to grow the industry. PADI cancelled the contract with Dibble et al, who alleged in their RICO action that afterwards the fatality rate of PADI-trained divers increased disproportionately to PADI's market-share.
As I've mentioned in prior posts, the US Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission have investigated and prosecuted the dive industry in the '80's and '90's.
In this era of Bernie Madoff, Enron et al, has the pendulum swung around again for the dive industry? Prosecution under criminal RICO statutes cannot be dragged out for years, as can civil complaints.
Of course many are apprehensive about any government intervention into a free market. More evidence of patterns, history, harms - and what benefits could be achieved from an intervention - should be presented. More to come...
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Questions posted on page-1:
Answered:
Answered:
Fatalities:
A report from a 2006 “Risk management” seminar that disclosed a dive fatality rate, per one insurance company insider, to be FAR HIGHER than what DAN reports - his statement implies >600 dive fatalities per year. Do Pooh-Bahs at the top of the industry’s pyramid coerce DMs and Instructors to “KEEP SECRETS for the good of the industry?”
I love diving and I love decent, hard-working dive pros -- just about everybody I’ve ever read on ScubaBoard I consider on the high side of the bell curve, sharing at heart the best interests of students - we just often disagree on how to accomplish that. Dive pros make a financial sacrifice for the sport you love. Good dive pros should not have to be apologists for the bottom end of the industry’s bell curve.
When Drew Richardson, now PADI’s president and COO, published a paper that cited data from the National Safety Council and DAN, which claimed diving's safety record under PADI protocol was comparable to bowling, did anyone actually investigate the nature and reliability of the data sources cited by Drew?
The bowling claim began in 1992, published by DAN in their annual report of dive fatalities that occurred in 1990 (see pages 9-10). But where did DAN get their data to make this comparison to bowling? Apparently, not from training agency or insurance company accident reports. AND NOT FROM DAN’S OWN DATABASE OF PRIOR INJURIES AND FATALITIES.
DAN’s numerator (number of victims) and denominator (universe of divers) are from two different data sources, which are both entirely outside the dive industry. In summary:
US government CPSC-NEISS data forecast from 1994, Fatalities / DCI:---- 0 / 0;
DAN as reported for 1994 ----------------------------------Fatalities / DCI: 104 / ~1,150).
For the numerator (total number of injuries): DAN used NEISS data from the US CPSC. NEISS gets reports from 90 hospital emergency rooms, scattered around the country, to estimate total the injuries that require treatment in America’s 7,500 hospitals (estimate). Divers who require recompression treatments go directly to hyperbaric chamber facilities, usually bypassing any NEISS-participating emergency rooms. Scuba accidents reported to NEISS throughout the 1990’s averaged less than 31 per year - too tiny a number from which to accurately forecast.
NEISS is notable for what accident data it does not report: automobile / motorcycle / firearm / food / medical product or drug interactions are all not reported. Instead, NEISS focuses on accidents associated with products that fall under the purview of the CPSC. For instance, “I fell down” (not caused by a product) is not reported to NEISS. Activities with higher frequency (e.g. cooking, biking and skating) produce vastly bigger datasets, and thus more reliable forecasts [NEISS guidelines]
In 4 out of the 9 years from 2000 to 2008, NEISS could not estimate national scuba accidents, because too few accidents were reported. To query the NEISS system: enter “Neiss Product Code” #: 1275 for scuba accidents in the FIRST “FROM” BOX. Run the query again for snorkeling accidents, enter code: 3274
For the denominator (the total number of divers): DAN picked 2.6 million divers, per a survey from the National Sporting Goods Association (NSGA). NSGA queried 20,000 homes, but NSGA has no data from dive retailers and training agencies. How the homes were selected is not known, nor what metric classified a “diver” (i.e. if someone dove once in the last five years are they included?). The larger the denominator, the safer diving appears to be.
A second source alleging a higher fatality rate:
700-800 dive deaths occur per year, per a published estimate using DAN / UHMS data that is restricted to medical researchers (per phone conversation with Dr. Shepherd). DAN’s annual accident reports disclose that the published deaths are only those with “sufficient” data; excluded are cases in litigation. It is believed that if cardiac failure appeared to be the cause of death, cases are not reported or not fully investigated by DAN. Notably, it is not possible to know if water aspiration occurred first, which may have triggered cardiac failure culminating in drowning, according to Jerome H. Modell, MD, arguably the single most respected medical professional in the United States regarding drownings.
Regardless of the total number of fatalities, I personally believe it is misleading to use the # of divers as a denominator. It should be the # of dives (i.e. exposure times vs. accidents) as I’ve posted here with factual citations from other industries.
Arguably, blind faith in the claim of diving’s safety might instill a lackadaisical attitude toward safety with some dive professionals, which might actually amplify hazards to cause more dive fatalities.
Those who can make you believe absurdities can make you commit atrocities - Voltaire
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