world record

[Akimbo]

Sorry for my ignorence when you mean "bounce" you mean to touch the mark and take off, kind of taking a selfy on a plase to let know you been there, right ?

Not exactly, but close in this case. The term “bounce dive” in the commercial diving industry is one where the bottom time is less than is required for full saturation. See What is Saturation Diving — which was in the early experimental stages in 1962.

In practice, the total dive times (leave surface to leave bottom) were usually under an hour and typically in the 200-600' range. In some areas of the world a “bounce dive” can mean any surface supplied or Scuba dive less than 24 hours where other places use it to describe a short duration dive made with a diving bell and deck chamber.

I have heard the term used in recreational diving to describe what can be called a “touch and go” dive like grabbing a depth marker tag on a descent line or a hand full of mud.

… Certainly a milestone in diving, but ill prepared which cost the lives of three Englishmen.

I was there as a spectator. Were you?...

No, but I remember it well. That dive was on my twelfth birthday. That was my first real lesson on how the media can totally screw up a report.

Three Englishman? I know about Keller’s bellmate Peter Small and the support diver Chris Whittaker but don’t recall a third. I read several Navy reports in the early 1970s on the Keller dive in the library at Submarine Development Group One. The article in Skin Diver Magazine (February 1963) written by Paul Tzimoulis was probably the best publically available description at the time.

The most thorough discussion I have seen is in Christopher Swann’s The History of Oilfield Diving: An Industrial Adventure. Chapter 8, Hannes Keller and His Secret Mixtures, even includes the gas mixtures used.

---------- Post added October 3rd, 2014 at 12:45 PM ----------

Sam

I was thinking about your “ill prepared” comment a little more, “under-funded” is probably more accurate. Keller and Bühlmann were on a shoe string budget and had no operational experience. Errors that seem obvious even to recreational Scuba divers experienced in such a benign area as Catalina were unknown to this Swiss mathematician who had been very deep a few times in Alpine lakes and in University chambers.

Even if they had the budget and at-sea experience, there would still have been Helium leaks, which was the root cause of the problems. Sealab was leaking badly a little more than 6 years later with the most experienced HeO2 divers in the world and on their third mission. Keller’s exposure protection and breathing systems were grossly inadequate… just like Sealab III. Finally, their knowledge of HPNS (High Pressure Nervous Syndrome) was rudimentary at best in those days.

Every early deep dive was ill prepared because it was a pioneering effort. The US Navy’s Sealab III, where Barry Cannon died, was well funded but also horribly ill prepared. Their problem was the project was way too rushed, which is often a problem on big-budget operations. Not nearly at the same pioneering level, but we were still constantly learning important and deadly lessons years later during the 1970s and 80s.

Thanks to all the pioneers that preceded me, living and dead.

 

[Sam Miller III]

......

No, but I remember it well. That dive was on my twelfth birthday. That was my first real lesson on how the media can totally screw up a report.

Three Englishman? I know about Keller’s bellmate Peter Small and the support diver Chris Whittaker but don’t recall a third. I read several Navy reports in the early 1970s on the Keller dive in the library at Submarine Development Group One. The article in Skin Diver Magazine (February 1963) written by Paul Tzimoulis was probably the best publically available description at the time.

The most thorough discussion I have seen is in Christopher Swann’s The History of Oilfield Diving: An Industrial Adventure. Chapter 8, Hannes Keller and His Secret Mixtures, even includes the gas mixtures used.

<>>>>>>>>---------- Post added October 3rd, 2014 at 12:45 PM ----------

Sam

I was thinking about your &#8220;ill prepared&#8221; comment a little more, &#8220;under-funded&#8221; is probably more accurate. Keller and Bühlmann were on a shoe string budget and had no operational experience. Errors that seem obvious even to recreational Scuba divers experienced in such a benign area as Catalina were unknown to this Swiss mathematician who had been very deep a few times in Alpine lakes and in University chambers.

Even if they had the budget and at-sea experience, there would still have been Helium leaks, which was the root cause of the problems. Sealab was leaking badly a little more than 6 years later with the most experienced HeO2 divers in the world and on their third mission. Keller&#8217;s exposure protection and breathing systems were grossly inadequate&#8230; just like Sealab III. Finally, their knowledge of HPNS (High Pressure Nervous Syndrome) was rudimentary at best in those days.

Every early deep dive was ill prepared because it was a pioneering effort. The US Navy&#8217;s Sealab III, where Barry Cannon died, was well funded but also horribly ill prepared. Their problem was the project was way too rushed, which is often a problem on big-budget operations. Not nearly at the same pioneering level, but we were still constantly learning important and deadly lessons years later during the 1970s and 80s.
......
.

I was considerably older than 12 and still recall the event- but can't recall what I had for breakfast this morning...(the march of time & age)

The third person to die as a indirect result of the dive was Peter's wife, Betty. "She couldn't bear to live with out Peter" so she turned on the gas stuck her head in the oven and silently passed away...death number three.
This has been well documented in several British books of that era which are buried some where in my library.

.The leak in the Keller bell was do to a fin being lodged in the hatch.

The late great American diver Dick Anderson and the inexperienced British diver Chris Whittaker were the safety divers who met the bell at 200 feet and discovered the protruding fin and the leak. They surfaced to obtain a sharper knife at which time it was noticed Whittaker, a English student studying at UCLA was bleeding profusely from the nose and had his PFV fully inflated. He changed tanks, took a knife punched the PFV and hopped over board never to be seen again.

Dick Anderson dove to the bell cut the fin and forced the bell shut with his head, which resulted in loss of hair ( he had ample) and some life long scares. His heroic actions sealed the bell but it was too late to save Peter Small who was already deceased. Keller was breathing the mixture - Small was not! (Keller was a jewel)

The best civilian report of the dive was by the BSAC in their Triton Magazine. I still have the copy

LA Co established a blue ribbon ad hoc committee for a local civilian investigation. It had no authority or consequence = Keller was long gone back to Switzerland and never to return until a few year ago after all the major players were gone.


Ah the days of our dives..

SDM

 

[Akimbo]

…The leak in the Keller bell was do to a fin being lodged in the hatch…

That wasn’t the first leak that precipitated the crisis. To refresh my memory I reviewed Christopher Swann’s The History of Oilfield Diving: An Industrial Adventure, which is consistent with the Navy reports I have read. There is a copy of Chapter 8 on the Web:
http://www.auas-nogi.org/hist_oil_field_keller.pdf

They all indicate that the deep (bottom) mix cylinders on the bell (the Atlantis) were almost empty when Keller returned from his short lockout/excursion. Keller was on open circuit Scuba during the lockout but connected to cylinders on the bell when inside, like Small was during the whole dive.

For context, remember that they both had to be suffering from HPNS (High Pressure Nervous Syndrome) and Compression Neuralgia (compression pains). It is also probable that their blood CO2 was pretty high due to high respiratory workloads (gas density plus 1962 single hose regulator technology). At best, neither was at the top of their game and more likely seriously compromised.

Logs from the B&W CCTV system indicated the excursion was closer to 30 seconds than the 5 minutes reported in the media. That “leak” started the cascade of problems that nearly killed both of them. I attribute it to a leak because every report I have seen indicates that the consumption rate could not have exhausted the deep mix supply that fast… it had to go somewhere and HP Helium leaks were a MAJOR problem in the early days.

The bell was pressurized with air to save money so the occupants had to stay inside their Cousteau Constant Volume Suits for their gas supply (image below). The Constant Volume Suit was basically a drysuit with a built-in hood with mask and a hole for a regulator — easily the worst rig I have ever dove.

The deep mix was 8% HeO2 and was used between 500 and 1000'. The decompression plan called for lifting the bell as soon as Keller returned while the hatch was still open. The “plan” called for switching to Trimix (15% Oxygen, 60% Helium, 25% Nitrogen) at 500' until 165'.

It appears that the deep mix ran out about 600' (100' shy of the planned switch) and Keller opened his faceplate on the suit, exposing him to the air atmosphere which had been diluted by their mixed gas exhalations and possible leaks in the bell. Not surprisingly, Keller immediately passed out. Small didn’t open his faceplate, which apparently left him with nothing to breathe. It isn’t clear what Small’s level of conscious at that point.

I’m not sure that they even had voice communications with the divers since they were in constant volume suits and Helium Speech Unscramblers hadn’t been invented yet. Comms couldn’t have been effective even if they tried. Understanding each other sitting in a chamber pressurized to 850' was pretty hard for the first few days, I can’t imagine how difficult it would be in a CV suit over an intercom.

The bell was lifted to 200' per the scheduled 17 minute rate in the decompression plan. Keller regained consciousness and opened Small’s faceplate. Keller closed the hatch to seal the bell so that they could complete decompression on deck, but the hatch didn’t make a seal — which is the leak Sam wrote about. It is probably safe to assume that Keller was far from peak consciousness at that point. Apparently Anderson (one of the safety divers) cutting away part of the fin combined with Keller pulling on it cleared the hatch which finally sealed.

The internal pressure of the bell was about 165' when it landed on deck, there was no mating deck chamber like today. Keller was on 50% Nitrox per the decompression plan and switched to 100% O2 at 50'. Decompression was extended from the planned 270 minutes to 410 minutes probably due to the various problems. Keller was fine, Peter Small was dead. It is unknown exactly when he expired, but I am guessing long before Keller regained consciousness and opened Small's faceplate.

It is “likely” that Peter Small would have survived had all the planned deep mix been available and there would have been no need for Anderson and Whittaker to make the dive to investigate the hatch leak. Like aviation, the history of breakthroughs in diving is paved with a lot of bodies.

 

[Doc]

I believe there is some kind of a PADI Distinctive Specialty patch qualified for here.