Brad Horn on the rEvo

[rjack321]

I'm curious to see why Brad's company says the rebreather at fault yet the court apparently disagreed and judged for the defendant.

Because Brad had no facts that actually proved his contentions, just a bunch of hypothetical scenarios that are close to impossible to actually create/replicate or outright smoke and mirrors - like their world famous APOC.

 

[C Dub]

I believe you were shown evidence. In a US court of law. When Mr. Concannon inserted it your rectum and it may still be there for all I know.

Your opinion stinks, has been discounted, and you have no place in a discussion where rebreathers are the topic.

Most awesome post ever.

 

[Jack Hammer]

I thought the scientificly conducted "lab" demonstration of "sticky water" was priceless...

 

[kelemvor]

I got the transcripts, and a few other documents. I haven't read them yet, but the verdict was pretty explicit. "Did LAMARTEK, INC. place a rebreather on the market with a defect which was a legal cause of injury or death to WESLEY SKILES? NO."

I must say scubaboard. Uploading files with the new forum software couldn't be better. Drag and drop right into the post!

 

[Tassi Devil Diver]

The rEvo would have to be one of the most innovative rebreather on the market; the split scrubber is just pure genius making it the only rebreather to offer scrubber redundancy. The rMs is the only scrubber monitoring system on the market that gives any indication of scrubber breakthrough, and is very effective and well thought out, the prediction algorithm behind it is just ingenious and works!! With the added benefit of maximising the use of sorb. Whilst others complain about the ADV, I have had no problem with it I can dial down to the level of cracking resistance I like and keep mine quite tight, other rebreathers I have tried you just have turn your head and the ADV fires. With only four o rings sealing the loop is least likely to flood due an error in building up, I also love it's compact size slim form. One of the few rebreathers with true PO2 monitoring redundancy with the 2 extra cells on dream.

 

[chillyinCanada]

I'm finding this thread quite amusing. Is that a common perspective?

 

[mderrick]

Sorry all, but I can't let the @Brad_Horn post that mentions W.S. case stand without contradiction...

The Skiles court case I understand focused solely on liability and not the actual root cause behind why the diver passed away

Your understanding is flawed because you must not have read the hours and hours of court testimony, nor have you read my 3 days of deposition on the cause. The jury was asked specifically was there a defect in the rebreather, it's item #2 in the verdict. So the "root cause" was not a design defect in the rebreather. The root cause was clear when the testimony in deposition and trial is viewed as a whole: The victim undertook a series of dives using equipment and techniques for which he was very clearly unqualified. He subsequently made an exceptionally lengthy chain of judgement and operational errors that were compounded by other individuals and institutions, which resulted in an entirely predictable but unfortunate outcome.

on ascent from a shallow dive in near perfect conditions

As was documented by computer profiles and autopsy results indicating barotrauma, the rate of ascent was likely excessive for a ~70 fsw dive. I would take issue with the characterization of the conditions as "near perfect." In fact, the conditions had been so poor in preceding days the diving had been cancelled. Conditions that day were marginal, there was: (1) NOAA Small Craft Advisory in effect. (2) Strong current and surge as documented in victims' video. (3) Surface conditions so rough that testimony documented it was extremely difficult to recover victim's body into the boat.

on an apparently perfectly good eCCR that was not alarming

I would take issue with the characterization of the eCCR as "perfectly good" and "not alarming." This specific eCCR unit had oxygen sensors installed 22 months previously (mfg recommendation is 12 months max) and an assembly error (misplaced seal) allowing minor CO2 bypass. It was being operated at a bottom PO2 setpoint of 1.4 and the ADV enabled which would have caused multiple high PO2 spikes. (This particular unit has an ADV shutoff which is supposed to be closed once the diver concludes the descent.) The unit was in fact alarming, as the victims video documents another diver talking through their loop to question the victim about the LED visual alarm indication, and the vibrating alarm (because it was touching the camera housing) can be heard clearly several times in the video. The HUD was oriented such that it was not visible to the victim and would have been impossible for the victim to always know their PO2. There was also 6ppm Carbon Monoxide (CO) found in the diluent. No, the unit was not "perfectly good".

had undergone a very thorough written checklist procedure by its diver, immediately before being dived.

It had not undergone a "thorough ... checklist". I was questioned for several hours in deposition about my evaluation of the checklist that was claimed as being used. I have trouble accepting the checklist entered in evidence was actually used by the victim because there is no way that checklist (or any other proper checklist) could have been successfully applied to that unit. The incoherent checklist presented was actually incomplete sections taken from two different types of checklists which would have been impossible for use to assemble and validate the unit. Further, it listed values and tests which did not agree with the unit as observed following the accident. As an example of numerous discrepancies: (1) Checklist documents both dates and mv readings for 4 oxygen sensors, but the unit was wired for and only contained 3 sensors. (2) Checklist records dates of sensors that do not appear to bear any relation to the actual dates of the sensors installed in the unit. (3) Checklist records mv readings for one of the sensors that would have disqualified the sensor from use and the unit from diving.

Seemingly something that could have happened to any diver, no matter how they got hold of the unit or were trained to dive it.

This statement seems to imply the accident could have happened to any diver regardless of their qualifications, which is misleading. It was never disputed by the plaintiff that the diver was not trained to be diving the rebreather involved in the accident. At trial the plaintiff's attorneys often implied that the victim's many years of open circuit experience and skills as an underwater photographer in some way enabled him to safely dive the unit without training. To be clear, the victim's lack of experience regarding rebreathers in general, and complete absence of training on this unit in particular, was a major contributing factor to the accident.

At trial, the defense actually had the plaintiff's expert read out loud to the jury from his company's own rebreather manual: "THIS REBREATHER IS A COMPLEX HUMAN LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM, WHICH OPERATES IN A MANNER ENTIRELY DIFFERENT TO CONVENTIONAL SCUBA OR OTHER REBREATHERS. USING THIS REBREATHER WITHOUT STUDY AND PASSING A MANUFACTURER-APPROVED TRAINING COURSE IS NO DIFFERENT FROM TAKING THE CONTROLS OF A HELICOPTER IN FLIGHT WITHOUT TRAINING: IT IS SUICIDAL. COMPLACENT USE OF THIS REBREATHER CAN CAUSE SERIOUS PERMANENT INJURY OR DEATH WITHOUT ANY PRIOR WARNING SYMPTOMS. THE USER IS ENTIRELY AND SOLELY RESPONSIBLE FOR MAINTAINING, INSPECTING AND OPERATING THIS REBREATHER, FOR HAVING A WORKING KNOWLEDGE OF THE ABORT PROCEDURES WHEN PROBLEMS ARISE. SAFE OPERATION OF THIS REBREATHER REQUIRES THE USER TO FOLLOW SPECIFIC PROCEDURES ON EVERY DIVE AND TO OBSERVE SCRUPULOUSLY THE SPECIFIED MAINTENANCE INTERVALS." Copyright 2009, OSEL

To SB members, I again apologize for resurrecting these issues and mean no disrespect, but simply could not let the remarks in question stand unchallenged even if they were trolling. Pete you are welcome to delete mine and/or his if you wish.

 

[reefrat]

I have seen so many Brad Horn induced or inflamed discussions over the years that all seem to start and end the same way.
-Is he a genuine "devils advocate" there to challenge and question conventional wisdom?
-Is he a troll?
-Is he truly representative of a revolutionary and maverick approach to rebreather development and safety!

Essentially- is he genuine or just eliciting response for the sake of it and therefore disrupting productive discussion?
Lastly, if it is the latter is there any value in allowing him to continue?

 

[Dr Simon Mitchell]

I'm curious to see why Brad's company says the rebreather at fault yet the court apparently disagreed and judged for the defendant.

Courts dislike unmitigated hypocrisy.

mderrick has already said it, but the manual for the rebreather Brad manufactures and sells says...

"USING THIS REBREATHER WITHOUT STUDY AND PASSING A MANUFACTURER-APPROVED TRAINING COURSE IS NO DIFFERENT FROM TAKING THE CONTROLS OF A HELICOPTER IN FLIGHT WITHOUT TRAINING: IT IS SUICIDAL".

Then he tries to blame the Optima when someone dies on one whilst diving it "without study and passing a manufacturer-approved training course".

I don't know what to say to be honest.

For hypocrisy at an even higher level, Brad seems to think it is acceptable to hypothesize a failsafe rebreather that his company's own experience has shown is undeliverable (they first took deposits for it 9 years ago and it is still nowhere to be seen), and then to have fun deeming all other rebreathers deficient when compared to that hypothetical undeliverable standard.

Make no mistake. The case being discussed could easily have been the end of rebreather diving as we know it. If a diver could dive a rebreather with no training, old cells, no buddy (at the time of the accident), medical issues, and a number of other things and "expert" witnesses could nevertheless persuade a jury that they could still blame the rebreather when it all went wrong, then selling rebreathers would have become untenable overnight.

Simon M

 

[Patoux01]

Apparently our "buddy" has been quite fast to update his "list".

Wes Skiles is still a rebreather design fault, Stewart is also heavily suggested as being a rebreather design fault. @Brad_Horn , care to elaborate?