I have to disagree with Mr. Barsky on one point: that Walker & Guiel 'were not victims of the diving industry' - I think they were, considering the way the industry was at that time. The pressures to perform & conform were much greater than they were even when I started ( 1981 ) in the offshore oilfields. The key to it all I believe was the Diving Superintendent John Nadeau. Apparently, he was one of the most respected diving leaders of that era in the N. Sea, yet he cut all those corners in preparing the system to dive because THE JOB HAD TO GET DONE!! No lack of pressure on Nadeau either. He's under tremendous pressure by Infabco to get the SALM install completed. He had to do this with a brand new sat system/dive vessel, without the benefit of a shakedown period to iron the bugs out of the system, and to see in general how the vessel performed. The diving crew faced similar strain, & I think the author demonstrates this sad reality in the chapter "Hobson's Choice", where he recalls a story from the 1600's: "Thomas Hobson owned a livery stable in Cambridge, England, and as the story goes, he used to give his customers only one choice when renting them a horse: the one closest to the door. If the customer indicated he wanted something else, Hobson would tell him to go find another stable when he knew there was none within a day's journey; more than 300 years later, Richard & Skip were now faced with Infabco's version of Hobson's choice: either dive or leave the job." I think every man on that dive crew recognized the problems inherent in the system & the jury-rigged changes made, but felt they had to risk it so that they would work another day.
Regards,
DSD