But it doesn't add up thats all.
Second there is always a chance that rumour and fable get in the way of truth. So much so that eventually some may even believe a lie. Especially with the press bending things out of shape to make more of a story.
This is one of the reasons you will notice why I always give clear, precise and verifiable background data to my diving posts simply in order for those with interest to verify factual truth.
So to this question of multiple diver deaths in a chamber explosion/fire. In order for a chamber fire to result in explosion you need oxygen and lots of it, together with the fuel and ignition source.
In a percentage term you need greater than about 30% Not forgetting the partial pressure aspects of saturation diving even during shallow decompression the chamber atmosphere is never allowed into this threshold for an oxygen related fire/explosion to occur.
That however doesn't preclude a fire, wire short electrical etc and in that fatality can and has occurred but by smoke inhalation not as you have described a flash oxygen fire/explosion.
Conversely even with small 54 inch DDC (deck decompression chambers) used universally for Sur D O2 in air diving. The blow down using air would never go below 40FSW so again the percentage and PP02 is insufficient for an oxygen PP related explosion. Unless by means of say the BIBS mask oxygen leakage but again this has to be a major leak and a gross breach of normal working procedure standards, with using oxygen with overboard dump systems for the exhaled gas and continuous chamber oxygen percentage monitoring by gas analysis being standard procedure.
Further more in all my experience with SUR D 02 only one diver is normally in the chamber at a time therefore negating this "multiple death" aspect of your quote.
Incidently an air chamber at 165FSW (50MSW) would be approaching the PP threshold but the application for having an air chamber at 165FSW would only be a serious type 1 bend or omitted decompression and again no multiple divers would be involved save the diver (now patient) himself and medic/attendant. Also I suspect in such serious condition "electronics" would not be brought in for entertainment say.
Further most Type 1 modern recompression procedures, allow the use a 50/50 mix of 02/Helium, heliox and is called a Comex 30 table. This reduces the chamber depth from 165 FSW (50MSW) to 100FSW (30MSW) and the 50% oxygen mix with 50% helium reduces drastically the TTUP total time under pressure. (reference below)
I have only been involved in one omitted decompression incident requiring an air chamber DDC to 165FSW and using air only when working for Maritime Offshore Projects 1981 MV Suffolk Blazer
West Sole platform pipeline and in that the only "explosion" we had was by intent after finding an old 500lb WW2 mine beside the 16" gas pipeline. (needless to say the mine was moved prior to its detonation and by caution the pipeline flooded)
But you see my point, against clear decisive verifiable fact it all gets out of shape doesn't make sense and why I suspect your story is a cut and paste article you read about in the papers at best and downright lies at worse.
Out of interest my other reason for asking details regarding this offshore oxygen chamber explosion is that by coincidence I am also a co author of the publication:
"Guide to fire safety standards for hyperbaric treatment centres. British Hyperbaric Association Technical Working Party Report. Aberdeen: British Hyperbaric Association, 1996."
Fire-safety standards for hyperbaric oxygen facilities : The Lancet
Any specific detail you have of this fatality I would be very grateful to receive further details. Iain Middlebrook
Comparison between USN6 and Cx30 recompression schedules for DCI