Diving incident at Eagles Nest Sink

[oya]

We all have heard about David Shaw.

I'm not going to lie, there were lots of interesting things to pull out of the Shaw accident.

But, I mean, there were lots of interesting things to pull out of the Challenger explosion, too. And those things were just about as relevant to the regular diving we do (and I am not even speaking in hyperbole here, I think they were EXACTLY as relevant) as the Shaw accident was.

This one is probably not that much different. Again, no exaggeration, probably about the same number of people have walked on the moon as been to some of the areas of cave as are involved in this accident. Are you one of them? Then it's probably not something to worry about.

Go read accidents that happen to divers like you and me. They're more important right now. Eventually facts will come out about this one and they'll be interesting and we'll learn a few things from them. But, like the Challenger accident, they'll be mostly philosophical and theoretical.

 

[Jack Hammer]

...I would like to know what happened

Ok here's the report originally posted by Charlie Roberson on CDF:

"Cave diving has a long history of accident analysis, which can be healthy and productive. Unfortunately, modern forms of communication and the twenty-four hour news cycle have trained us to expect up-to-the-minute reporting and rapid release of information. This is a reality of the modern world and without facts people are left to speculation and misinformation. The following statement of facts has been reviewed by those involved in the search and recovery efforts. That being said, there may be errors; however, these are the relevant facts as we know them.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

1. Chris Rittenmeyer and Patrick Peacock started a dive at Eagle's Nest around 2:00 p.m. on Saturday, October 15, 2016. They were on JJ-CCRs with 95cf sidemount bailouts. Each diver had a scooter and an AL80 safety. They also towed a backup scooter. They had placed all their deco safeties in the cave the day before.
2. Chris and Patrick were both fully trained as Full Cave, Trimix, CCR, and DPV divers. Both divers had years of ocean and cave diving experience.
3. When the divers failed to return to deco at the anticipated time, their surface support buddy checked every 30 minutes until they were several hours overdue. Their buddy called Cave Country Dive Shop around 6:00 p.m. and spoke to Jon Bernot, who immediately loaded his vehicle and started driving to Eagle's Nest. While enroute, Jon called around and activated a response team of qualified and available cave divers.
4. Search Team 1, of Jon Bernot and Charlie Roberson, got underway around 11:00 p.m. to search the upstream passage, which was the dive plan according to the buddy. Team 1 checked the habitat and spotted three O2 bottles at 20 ffw, four 50% at 70 ffw, and two 120 bottles on the top of the mound, all of which were untouched. Team 1 noticed that the 120 bottles were on the downstream side of the line but decided to go ahead and check the upstream since that was believed to be the dive plan. Team 1 scoured the entire upstream all the way to the far reaches of the Green Room, King's Challenge, and all the large passage and rooms. When Team I failed to find anything upstream, they proceeded to check the Lockwood tunnel to no avail. Team 1 surfaced around 3:30 a.m.
5. Search Team 2, of Ted McCoy and AJ Gonzales, got underway around 3:45 a.m. and headed downstream. They immediately found the two bodies on the exit side of the Pit in approximately 220-230 ffw. Team 2 fully documented the scene and took detailed notes for about 45 minutes before exiting.
6. Diver 1 was wearing his CCR but his bailouts were not in place. One empty 95 bailout was beside him and attached to his rig via a QC6 and the long hose was deployed. His loop was open and out of his mouth. The inhale side of the loop was crushed. He had 300 psi of O2 but no onboard diluent remaining. He did have a 13cf inflation bottle with gas remaining. He had no primary light head and his backup lights were not deployed. There was a single scooter near Diver 1 but it was unclipped and turned off.
7. Diver 2 was only wearing a drysuit, mask and fins and was positively buoyant. He had a backup light clipped off and dangling out of his pocket. No other bottles were nearby.
8. A full AL80 safety was located just on the exit side of the Pit restriction in 270 ffw but was not easily seen on the way out. The primary light head with e/o cord was also located on the exit side of the Pit restriction. Their other full AL80 safety was located beside another team’s full safety just downstream of the jump to the Lockwood tunnel.
9. Two 95 bailouts were located just on the far side of the Pit. Both were empty.
10. Recovery Team 1 brought both bodies to the top of the Ballroom and Recovery Team 2 brought both bodies to the surface on Sunday afternoon.
11. Diver 2's CCR, a 95 bailout, and two scooters were located on Monday morning just outside the restriction to Revelation Space in the Room of Dreams. The CCR loop was closed and appeared to be fully operational. The 95 bailout was full. Diver 2 had video lights for a GoPro plugged into his canister light.
12. The gear recovery team of Jon Bernot and James Draker removed all the gear from the cave and turned it over to law enforcement on Monday, October 17, 2016.

The nature of accident analysis is that it's critical of those involved. However, friends, family, and those involved in the recovery have many raw emotions regarding this loss. I ask that you keep this in mind as you proceed with a thorough and professional accident analysis.

Safe diving,
Charlie Roberson"

 

[CptTightPants21]

Maybe for you, but us regular divers don't understand what the hell happened, and we (I've) been told to be patient. Are you implying we have gotten all we are going to get?

That statement by the recovery divers was pretty thorough. We might get a few more details, but I wouldn't expect much more unless the Go Pro video exists and is released. Some things we may never know.

I am a little biased, but I believe my post before (quoted below) provides a good possibility of what happened given the facts we know and the experience of the divers. Being found so close together, but far away from initial gear ditch, with all breathable tanks drained points to controlled and conscious decision get get back to a safety bottle and not some out of control panic. The depths and distances they penetrated doesn't point to a gas contamination issue.

It sounds like one of the divers believed they could not get past the restriction so he took off his rebreather. The other diver was able to make it through with his CCR. Both divers then attempted to exit with one diver breathing off an LP95.

There was some delay (possibly the lack of a rebreather made the diver buoyant and he had a difficult time staying off the ceiling). The delay, the depth, and the added stress caused both LP95s to be exhausted and in the process draining the other rebreather divers dil.

I wonder why they didn't scooter? Maybe combination silt out, buoyant buddy, restrictions?

Either way, it looks like both divers stuck together to the very end. And it would appear the leaving of the full 95 behind was a costly mistake.

There is obviously a bunch of speculation in this post, but the situation does remind me of a fundamental fact......Slow is smooth, and smooth is fast.

Stop, calm down, assess your situation, and develop a plan

 

[Dan]

David Shaw (2005) video:

 

[packrat12]

....But, I mean, there were lots of interesting things to pull out of the Challenger explosion, too. And those things were just about as relevant to the regular diving we do (and I am not even speaking in hyperbole here, I think they were EXACTLY as relevant) as the Shaw accident was...

In an irony oya, both Shaw and the Challenger were from the same basic cause. Lessons from either of them could have helped the other. (I was near the Cape when Challenger blew up and live/work in that environment).

A big part of why the Challenger exploded was a 'go fever'. There was a perception that it needed to be launched then. This allowed the engineers to ignore concerns and continue to a point where failure was an option.

David Shaw told the family and press that he was going to recover the body he had found. He had 'go fever'. It became his focus and may very well have contributed to his death.

During my Trimix training, we watched and discussed Shaw's death. The point of the instruction was to understand that a diver should not dive with the 'I must do it' mentality. It was to stress that anyone can call the dive for any reason without repercussions. The instructor felt that the body recovery had overtaken the seriousness of the dive itself and contributed to Shaw's death.

 

[Doby45]

Not to be demanding of information, but has anything been collected from their computers? Their computers should tell the tell regarding possible gas problems, as far as blend and PO2..

 

[catone]

Based on info on cdf, the download is a bit problematic due to extremely large dive time (I think somewhere in the 30-40 hr range)

 

[MXGratefulDiver]

In an irony oya, both Shaw and the Challenger were from the same basic cause. Lessons from either of them could have helped the other. (I was near the Cape when Challenger blew up and live/work in that environment).

A big part of why the Challenger exploded was a 'go fever'. There was a perception that it needed to be launched then. This allowed the engineers to ignore concerns and continue to a point where failure was an option.

David Shaw told the family and press that he was going to recover the body he had found. He had 'go fever'. It became his focus and may very well have contributed to his death.

During my Trimix training, we watched and discussed Shaw's death. The point of the instruction was to understand that a diver should not dive with the 'I must do it' mentality. It was to stress that anyone can call the dive for any reason without repercussions. The instructor felt that the body recovery had overtaken the seriousness of the dive itself and contributed to Shaw's death.

Seems to me you could add Dr. Deep to that list as well ...

... Bob (Grateful Diver)

 

[Dan]

David Shaw went down to 271m (891') in Boesmansgat, Northern Cape, South Africa. It was a lot deeper than the Eagles Nest, so he encountered different set of problems than that of Patrick Peacock & Chris Rittenmeyer. However being able to view what is in the GoPro would be a good learning experience. I hope it'll be available for everyone to see someday, like that of David Shaw's.

 

[CuzzA]

I'm not going to lie, there were lots of interesting things to pull out of the Shaw accident.

But, I mean, there were lots of interesting things to pull out of the Challenger explosion, too. And those things were just about as relevant to the regular diving we do (and I am not even speaking in hyperbole here, I think they were EXACTLY as relevant) as the Shaw accident was.

This one is probably not that much different. Again, no exaggeration, probably about the same number of people have walked on the moon as been to some of the areas of cave as are involved in this accident. Are you one of them? Then it's probably not something to worry about.

Go read accidents that happen to divers like you and me. They're more important right now. Eventually facts will come out about this one and they'll be interesting and we'll learn a few things from them. But, like the Challenger accident, they'll be mostly philosophical and theoretical.

So, let me put this into a little perspective.

I was at my dive shop today filling a couple tanks to go catch some dinner next week. My instructor is a full cave technical instructor. They had a Prism rebreather disassembled on the table as I walked in and we've been discussing the advantages of CC for me. We also discussed scheduling my advanced recreational trimix class. We discussed this incident. I asked if he had ever dove Eagles Nest and his reply was basically, it's his playground (my words, not his). I also learned a little more about what's happening behind the scenes with this incident.

Now, I don't know if I will ever get cave trained. I have a 3 and half year old and found out a week ago I've got another on the way. So right now it is out, but there's a possibility I may dive there one day or do similar dives.

So while this incident isn't something I need to worry about right now, there may be something I learn that could apply to future diving. I found the gas density/lung report fascinating and that could apply to anyone diving deep, not just in a cave, not just on CC and not necessarily extremely deep.