Umbilical severed at 80 meters in North Sea

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Akimbo, thank you for providing these presentations. I was especially interested in the top PowerPoint titled "DSV Bippy Topez Incident 18 September 2012." I was especially interested in the safety aspects, as I am a safety professional with 35 years of experience, but not in the diving industry. My diving has been either military, instructional, or sport (currently). The British system with the Health and Safety Executive is the equivalent of our OSHA, except that I think the British Health and Safety Executive is in some ways more advanced.

In the presentation, they mentioned some things that I don't think the divers are aware of, and so I will provide a bit of commentary about them. These are product safety concepts, and even some safety professionals are not thoroughly aware of these tools.

FMEA
This is what we call a "Failure Modes and Effects Analysis". It looks at each component in a system, and in tabular format shows the "Component Name and Number," its "Function," the "Faulure Mode and Cause," the "Failure Effect On" "Next Higher Item" and End Item Product," the "Probability of Failure" (lambda to the 0.000001 power), and the "Corrective Action Available or Recommended." This analysis is done item by item within a system. It is an intensive and very productive way of looking at failures or failure potentials. It is best done as a preventive exercise, which occurs in Process Safety Management systems (mostly with chemicals and oil systems).

The FMEA can provide the following functions:

1. Systematic review of component failure modes to ensure that any failure produces minimal damage to the product.
2. Determining the effects that such failures will have on other items in the product and their functions.
3. Determining those parts whose failures would have critical effects on product operations, thus producing the greatest damage, and which failure modes will generate these damaging effects.
4. Calculating the probabilities of failure in assemblies, subassemblies, and products from the individual failure probabilities of their components and the arrangements in which they have been designed. Since components have more than one failure mode, the probability that one will fail at all is the total probability of all failure modes. One or more of these modes may be one that can generate an accident, whereas the others will not. Each mode must therefore be considered separately.
5. Establishing test program requirements to determine failure mode and rate data not available from other sources.
6. Establishing test program requirements to verify empirical reliability predictions.
7. Providing input data for trade-off studies to establish the effectiveness of changes in a proposed product or to determine the probable effect of modifications on an existing product.
8. Determining how probabilities of failure of components, assemblies, and the product can be reduced by using high reliability compenents, redundacies in design, or both.
9. Eliminating or minimizing the adverse effects that assembly failures could generate and indiating safeguardsto be incorporated if products cannot be made fail-safe or brought within acceptable failure limits.

In its original usages, failure modes and effects analysis determined where improvements in component life or design were necessary; and because failure intervals and probabilities wer estimated, maintenance periods and requirements could be established. FMEA has proven effective for both purposes. Deficiencies can be eliminated or minimized through design changes, redundancies, incorporation of fail-safe features, closer control of critical characteristics during manufacture and use, and extra care at the facilities of the subcontractors or users.

Effects of human actions on the product are not generally included in failure modes and effects analysis; these effects are considered to be the province of human engineering. Bioenvironmetal engineering is another area of investigation considered only from the standpoint of analyzing equipment required for environment control for failure modes and rates...
Hamar, Willie, Product Safety Management and Engineering, Second Edition, American Society of Safety Engineers, 1993, pages 151-153

FMECA (Failure Modes, Effects and Criticality Analysis)

Certain components or assemblies in any product are especially cricital to the product's mission and the well-being of its operators. THerefore, they should be given special attention and should be analyzed more thoroughly than others. Which compenonts are critical can be established through experience or as the products of analyses...
IBID, page 153.

These are what in the semiconductor industry are known as "safety critical" components.

CE Mark

In order to gain a "CE Mark" these types of analyses and a third-party review needs to be completed. Without this CE Mark, the product cannot be sold in the European Community.

It appears that all concerned are taking this near-fatal accident very seriously, and proceeding with due diligence.

SeaRat
John C. Ratliff, CSP, CIH, MSPH
 
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DNV (Det Norske Veritas) required a formal failure mode analysis for diving systems installed on Norwegian flag vessels since the mid-1970s. The US Navy also used it on the Mark II Deep Dive System in the early 70s. In both cases, we submitted reports which engineers analyzed and asked questions until the safety criteria was met.

The "simplified summary" came down to three or more failures before life support failure -- besides pressure vessel failure which had their own certification procedure analogous to ASME-PVHO (American Society of Mechanical Engineers, Pressure Vessels for Human Occupancy). The Bibby Topaz is a DNV vessel.

DNV has some pretty thorough specifications regarding all aspects of diving system design, in addition to the vessel itself. They helped form the Norwegian Underwater Institute (NUI) in 1976, now the Norwegian Underwater Technology Centre (Nutec). Most of my work was in the Norwegian Sector for Norwegian clients so didn't work with HSE. I understand both are far more enlightened than OSHA in this area. You can be sure that this incident summary isn't the last to be written.

Even in the first generation DSVs (Diving Support Vessels), DNV certification was very rigorous. I was aboard the first DNV certified DSV and worked on the second. The DP computer had a dedicated compartment behind the bridge with a DEC VAX computer in a RETMA rack about 7' tall. These DP systems were also made by Kongsberg. There are kitchen appliances with more computing power now! Three acoustic transducers were placed on the bottom and the system triangulated off them. They were about 8" in diameter and 6' tall plus the stand.

Even though DP had been used for years on floaters (floating drilling ships and platforms), there was no diver risk to speak of. The idea of using DP with divers locked out about 22/7 for about 11 months/year was met with more than a little trepidation! Drill ships were more than 400' while early DSVs were 200-250' long. Damn if it didn't work better than four-point mooring that it replaced. This is the first "incident" of any kind I am aware of DP failure -- not that there have not been DP failures, just no damage or injuries. These ships operate within 50' of fixed and semisubmersible platforms all the time. We fully expected serious collisions to be pretty common. Glad we were wrong!
 
For those who don't know about DP, I thought that a bit of background might be helpful. Dynamic Positioning (DP) is defined as "a system which automatically controls a vessel's position and heading exclusively by means of active thrust." Vessels using moorings (without active DP) have a number of advantages including economy (no active use of thrusters/engines that burn fuel). It is sometimes however the best option for many operations to use DP because the seabed can become cluttered with pipelines and other hardware (laying anchors has a high risk of damage to pipelines or wellheads). The option to moor to a platform rather than the seabed is also less frequent, because support vessels have become larger and platforms are not designed for the loads that can be placed in the mooring lines. There is also a risk that the DP vessel will make contact with a platform.

DNV isn't the only society in the game when it comes to defining class notations for DP-capable vessels. The notations from each of the societies vary, but refer to the compliance with the equipment classes. The societies include the LLoyd's Register, DNV and ABS (the American Bureau of Shipping).

Dynamic Positioning (DP) classifications can be confusing, so to clarify in basic terms, the equipment classes are:

Class 1 - refers to non-redundant vessels (providing automatic and manual position/heading control under specified maximum environmental conditions)

Class 2 - relates to vessels with full redundancy of systems and equipment (automatic and manual position/heading control under specified maximum environmental conditions, during and following any single fault excluding loss of a compartment and equipped with two independent computer systems); and

Class 3 - must be able to withstand the loss of all systems in any one compartment from the effects of fire or flooding (automatic and manual position/heading control under specified maximum environmental conditions, during and following any single fault excluding loss of a compartment and equipped with two independent computer systems with a separate back-up system [physically separated].

The certification process is extensive and subject to annual review. Operators also must be qualified and a DPO (Dynamic Positioning Officer) must be "on watch" whenever the DP is active. (in addition to the normal bridge crew).
 
After visiting with my marine vessel people, it appears DP I and II that we use tend to go "offsite" more often than not. As a matter of practice DP is not allowed for some critical operations due to inherent issues. In these situations the captains are required to manually control the vessel. The preferance is "anchored spreads" were it is possible.

Still an amazing story, team seperation, diver actions, search and rescue, and final recovery.
 
As Akimbo stated,
Although this accident happened under HSE jurisdiction, the Norwegians are looking hard into the matter. Whats great is the fact that information is being shared across the board. Between Bibby, HSE, Norway and the Divers Association. No one is trying to brush things under the carpet, as was the knee jerk reaction in the past. Everyone is looking to make this a positive learning experience, and to see that it doesn't happen again. It is a really positive step.
 
............. 9 years with no fatalities in the North Sea seems like another miracle.


plz, dont hurt me for recovering these old Thread!
I know about two Incidents in the Northsea. One at May 2012 and one July 2010. Both ended tragically. RIP!

1st Incident was a Heartattack in -2m at Windpark alpha ventus and the 2nd was a Umbillical severed in -40m in the Windfarm Bard Offshore 1!

Greetings from Germany

Stephan
 
And one more! RIP!


13. Juli 2013

A British diver killed during underwater work in the offshore wind farm "Riffgat" Borkum. The 26-year-old had been buried in 20 meters depth by a concrete mat, said police.

The mats were spread for weighting of supply cables on the seabed. Immediately initiated resuscitation attempts were unsuccessful. The diving support vessel with the corpse of the victim with more information in on the way to Emden. There started the investigation for the accident.

The diver and his comrad wanted to bring the concrete mat in position, according to the energy supplier EWE Oldenburg.
Then he had fallen under the mat. An emergency doctor who was brought from a rescue boat to the scene, could only diagnose the death of the diver. Also a rescue helicopter was in use.

EWE and the project developer Enova build the wind farm "Riffgat" with 30 plants since mid-2012. In addition to the water police and the labor inspectorate in Oldenburg as the licensing authority was informed about the incident. In recent years, there had been several fatal accidents with divers in offshore wind farms in the North Sea. The work up to 40 meters deep water are considered dangerous because they are hampered by strong currents, poor visibility and waves.





Also thanks to DandyDon

http://www.scubaboard.com/forums/accidents-incidents/460073-british-fatality-wind-farm-germany.html




RIP
 
Wow..A lot of posts, and a lot of 'presumtion'....for the record, I was in Sat on the Topaz that evening, and was setting up to enjoy a shift 'off' due to weather, when that came over the comms... Bottom line. Only bullet points: DP computer went mad ( like never before) both divers were instructed to get on top of the structure (standard procedure on an Amber DP alarm) both divers got on top of the stucture, but CL got his umbilical caught up on a transponder beacon that shouldnt have been there... To begin with, he was being pulled to the 'foul point' and braced against it, as it would have meant he would have been minced in the gap...his umbilical parted, he fell to the seabed, and Diver DY got back to the bell...CL, alone in a way that noone else could comprehend, staggered around the seabed a little, and run into. Down line that we had attached to the manifold. He climbed to the top and waited.... The Captain and 1st Officer did an amaizing job, moving the vessel back to the area, athe ROV pilot did something amazing, by eyeballing him, a good 400m before the boat saw him, then...well I saw what Diver DY did, and, well, I don't think many divers in the North Sea could do the rescue he did...
anyways, upshotwasMe and my bell partner KC recieved him, and treated him.. He apologised profusely for ruining everyones Sat, but then that's the kinda guy he is...still a diver on the Topaz, despite the many reccomendations to take an insurance payout... The boy is an isperation to me..one thing I remeber most..he felt the need to tell me about his feelings down there, and at one point told me "S98...It's not that bad... It's sad, bacause everybody that loves you will be sad,....but it's not too hard....
apart from not being able to get a line into him, that is something that will always be with me...
 
18 minutes for an adult is The True Second Chance. Kids have survived some hellacious immersions, in cold water due to the mammalian reflex response, but adults?

Not this long. I don't think the guy is gonna do the New York Times crossword puzzles in record-setting times from here on out, but he'll be able to wipe his own ....ah, you get it.... for a good long time, and that's a good thing.
 

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